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550. Act of 1929 Amended.
In the attempt to solve the problem of taxing national
banks' and to comply with the requirements of Section
5219 of the United States Revised Statutes, which sets
forth the conditions upon which the states may tax
national banks, a drastic change was recently effected
in the taxation of corporations in California. This
change was authorized by a constitutional amendment2
approved by the people November 6, 1928. In pursu-
ance thereof the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
1. For a detailed discussion of national bank taxation in general and
for an analysis of some of the problems presented by the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act as enacted in 1929, see
Traynor, National Bank Taxation in California (1929), 17 Calif.
L. Rev. 83, 232, 456.
2. Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 16: "Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of this Constitution:
1 (a) Banks, including national banking associations, located
within the limits of this state, shall annually pay to the state a
tax according to or measured by their net income, which shall
be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county and mu-
nicipal, upon such banks, or the shares thereof, except taxes
upon their real property. The amount of the tax shall be equiva-
lent to four per cent. of their net income.
(b) The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected
to each of the two houses voting in favor thereof, in lieu of
such tax may provide by law for any other form of taxation
now or hereafter permitted by the congress of the United States
respecting national banking associations; provided, that such
form of taxation shall apply to all banks located within the
limits of this state.
(c) If it be finally determined that any tax levied upon or
respecting any bank, national banking association, or the shares
thereof, is invalid, said bank or association, or the shares thereof,
shall be reassessed in conformity with any method provided by
law. No claim against the state for refund or rebate of taxes
paid shall be allowed without first deducting therefrom the
amount of any such unpaid reassessment.
2 (a) All financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business
corporations doing business within the limits of this state, sub-
ject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 14 of this
article (see No. 301), in lieu of the tax thereby provided for,
shall annually pay to the state for the privilege of exercising
their corporate franchises within this state a tax according to
or measured by their net income. The amount of such state
tax shall be equivalent to four per cent. of their net income.
Such tax shall be subject to offset, in a manner to be prescribed
by law, in the amount of personal property taxes paid by such
corporations to the state or political subdivisions thereof, but
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Act was passed and went into effect upon March 1,
1929.' In 1931 various provisions of this act were
amended.'
551. Corporations Taxable.
To be taxable under the act a corporation must (1)
be a bank or a "financial, mercantile, manufacturing
or business corporation doing business within the limits
of this state," and (2) if it is a corporation other than
a bank it must have been subject to the old franchise
tax.' The first condition ostensibly precludes the taxa-
tion of corporations that are not "doing business" in
the state and excludes those that are not banks or
mercantile, manufacturing or business corporations.
The "dqing business" requirement has been virtually
the offset shall not exceed ninety per cent of such state tax. In
any event, each such corporation shall pay an annual minimum
tax to the state, not subject to offset, of twenty-five dollars.
(b) The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected
to each of the two houses voting in favor thereof may provide
by law for the taxation by any other method authorized in this
Constitution of the corporations, or the franchises, subject to be
taxed pursuant to subdivision (a) of paragraph 2 of this section
or subdivision (d) of section 14 of this article.
3. The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to
each of the two houses voting in favor thereof, may change by
law the rates of tax, or the percentage, amount or nature of
offset provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof.
5. The Legislature shall define "corporations" and "doingbusiness"; shall define "net income," and may define it to be
the entire net income received from all sources; shall providefor the allocation of income, for the assessment, levy and col-lection of the aforesaid taxes, and for reassessment in the event
of the invalidity of any tax under 2(a) or 2(b) hereof. Said
taxes shall become a lien on the first Monday in March of 1929
and of each year thereafter. The Legislature shall pass laws
necessary to carry out this section. The acts of the forty-eighth
session of the Legislature passed pursuant to this section shallbe effective immediately upon their passage."
3. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13.
4. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, 65, 1066.
5. Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The old franchise tax is providedfor in Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 14(d), and in Cal. Pol Code,
.Sec 3664(d).
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abolished by the broad definition given those words in
the amendments of 1931 discussed below. The second
condition precludes the taxation under the new act of
the franchises of insurance companies; public utilities,
i. e., railroad, street railway, car, express, telegraph,
telephone, gas' and electric companies; and highway
transportation companies; for they were not subject to
the old franchise tax. Public utilities, including high-
way transportation companies, remain taxable upon
their gross receipts, the tax thereon being in lieu of
all other taxes, state, county and municipal, upon their
operative property. The gross receipts tax is exclu-
sively for state purposes with the exception of the
highway transportation company tax, one-half of which
is apportioned to the counties for road purposes.6 Insur-
ance companies doing business in this state are taxed
on their gross premiums, except that ocean marine
insurance carriers are taxed on their net underwriting
profit. A deduction is allowed from the amount of the
gross premium tax on insurance companies for any
county or municipal taxes on their real estate. This
tax is in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state,
county, and municipal, upon the property of such com-
panies, except county and municipal taxes on their real
estate,7 and is exclusively for state purposes.
All corporations which are excluded from taxation
under the new act and which were subject to the old
franchise tax remain subject thereto. Corporate fran-
chises still remain taxable exclusively for state pur-
poses.'
6. Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 14 (a) (aa); Sec. 15, Cal. Pol. Code
Sec. 3664, 3664(a), (aa).
7. Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 14(b); Cal. Pol. Code. Sec. 3664(b).
8. See (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 456, 496.
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552. What Is Meant by "Doing Business".
The act and the constitutional amendment in pursu-
ance of which it was passed should have been more
explicit as to what corporations are subject to the new
tax. The term "business corporation" is perhaps the
most vague, and although it will probably require judi-
cial definition it will at least include corporations organ-
ized for profit.sa "Doing business" was defined by the
8a. Non-Profit Corporations; Building and Loan Associations; Co-
operative Marketing Associations; Mutual Savings Banks. In 17
California Law Review 492, after quoting the definition of "cor-
poration" and of "doing business" from section 5 of the act, it is
stated: "It is evident that as applied to 'business corporations' in
the first provision above [the definition of "corporation"] and as
used in the phrases 'doing business' and 'doing intrastate busi-
ness' in the second provision, [the definition of "doing business"]
the term 'business' refers to three different situations. In the
first use it characterizes a kind of corporate activity; in the
second it relates corporate activity to corporate purpose, and in
the third it characterizes the kind and degree of corporate ac-
tivity of foreign corporations over which the state may have
taxing jurisdiction. It is apparent that these three different
uses of the term cannot be related for the purpose of mutual
definition.
"In the first use 'business' refers to a difference in kind be-
tween corporations. Only corporations of the kind specified are
taxable under the act. The provision classifies the taxable types
as 'financial', 'mercantile', 'manufacturing' and 'business'. It is
true that the section does not define the quality that characterizes
a corporation as a 'business corporation,' however, neither does it
do so as to 'financial', 'mercantile' or 'manufacturing' corpora-
tions. The exact definition in each case must be found in ju-
dicial decision with the difference perhaps that the nature of a
'business corporation' is less clearly recognized than that of the
other types listed.
"In view of the fact that the wording of the statute incorpor-
ates the wording of Section 5219 judicial determination of the
term 'business corporation' as used in that section would de-
termine the definition of that term as used in ihe California
statute. However, since there has been no decision upon this
point under Section 5219, we must turn to other decisions for
assistance in determining the nature of a business corporation
and we find numerous cases supporting the view that any cor-
poration whose purpose is that of personal material gain of a
pecuniary nature to its members is a business corporation. [Au-
thorities cited.]
"In view of the statutory definitions above quoted it may be
asked if a non-profit corporation is or is not a business cor-
poration within the meaning of the 3mendment and statute.
Since it would seem to follow from the second definition above
quoted that profit in the sense of money dividends is not the
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1929 act as "any transaction or transactions in the
course of its business by a corporation created under
the laws of this state or by a foreign corporation quali-
fied to do or doing intrastate business in this state".'
In 1931 the act was amended by adding to the definition
just given the following: "and shall include the right
to do business through such incorporation or qualifica-
tion".xo
necessary quality of a business activity it would appear that an
examination of the nature of each particular non-profit corpora-
tion would be necessary. If non-profit activities are means of
furthering a non-business purpose (as in the case of charitable
or fraternal organizations), corporations engaging in such activi-
ties should not come under the act. However, where the non-
profit activity is in furtherance of a business or mercantile end
(as in the case of a co-operative marketing association), corpora-
tions engaged in such activities will probably be subject to taxa-
tion under the act as other corporations organized for financial,
'mercantile, manufatcuring or business ends.'
"The act itself supports this view by implication, for sub-
division (k) of Section 5 thereof provides, with respect to 'as-
sociations organized and operated in whole or in part on a
co-operative or a mutual basis,' for exempting from the tax base,
income derived from non-profit activities. [See also the special
provisions in subdivisiois (i) (j) and (1) for building and loan
associations, mutual savings banks, and co-operative marketing
associations.] In the light of this provision it is evident that the
act itself intended that non-profit organizations engaged in
financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business ends should
come under the provisions of the act. The most important prac-
tical effect of this conclusion, as it affects these corporations, is
that, if there is no net income after the statutory deductions are
allowed, the provision for a minimum tax of $25 on every
corporation taxable applies." See also Opinion of the Attorney
General to Franchise Tax Commissioner No. 7004, Jan. 28, 1930,
to the effect that the special provisions made for the class of
corporations mentioned indicate conclusively that they are "busi-
ness corporations" within the meaning of the act.
9. See the following cases decided by the State Board of Equaliza-
tion for a detailed analysis of this definition. In each case the
question was whether the corporation was "doing business"
within the meaning of the Act. In the Matter of the Appeal
of Magalia Mining Company (January 7, 1930), Prentice Hall,
State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1. par. 11,018; in the Matter
of Appeal of Portland, California Steamship Co. (Nov. 20, 1930)
Ibid. par. 11,058; In Matter of Appeal of Eyre Investment Co.
(May 11, 1931), Ibid. par. 11,601; In Matter of Appeal of Boca
Land Co. (May 11, 1931), Ibid. par. 11082; In Matter of Appeal
of Miss Saylors, Inc. (May 12, 1931), Ibid. par. 11,094. See, also,(1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 456, 492.
10. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, sec. 1, amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066,
sec. 1.
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Even though there are no "transactions in the course
of its business by a corporation created under the laws
of this state or by a foreign corporation qualified to do
business in this state", such corporations are, under the
latest definition, by legislative fiat, "doing business" if
they merely enjoy the "right to do business". It is
difficult to understand how having the "right to do"
something can sensibly be "doing" that something. The
Legislature, as a result of this amendment, has, under
the guise of defining terms, actually changed the nature
of the tax imposed upon some corporations from an
excise tax on the doing of business to a license tax on
the right to do business. The 1929 act and the 1931
amendments were enacted pursuant to the provisions
of Section 16 of Article XIII of the State Constitution.
Although that section authorizes the Legislature to
define various terms," including the term "doing busi-
ness", it is doubtful whether that body can constitu-
tionally provide for a different tax from that author-
ized simply by the engaging device of defining terms.
It would seem, therefore, that unless under Section 16,
or under authority independently thereof, the Legisla-
ture can impose a license tax upon the right to do
business, the 1931 amendment is of questionable valid-
ity. The practical results of the amendment, if valid,
are to set at rest any question as to whether or not
holding companies' 2 or corporations that merely per-
form acts going to the maintenance of corporate exist-
ence" are "doing btisiness" (the question whether or
not a particular corporation is a "business corporation"
within the act is apparently not affected by the amend-
11. Cal. Const. Art. XIII, sec. 16 subd. 5.
12. See (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 456, 494.
13. For example, cases like those cited supra, note 9.
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ment); to increase the number of corporations subject
to the minimum tax of $25, and probably in some cases
to subject domestic corporations, not actually doing
business, to a greater tax than the minimum because
of their receipt of dividends declared out of income
from business done without this state.1 4
It is proposed now to discuss the constitutionality of
this amendment. Under the provisions of paragraph
2 (a) of Section 16 i
"All financial, mercantile, manufacturing and
business corporations doing business within the
limits of this state, subject to be taxed pursuant
to subdivision (d) of section 14 of this article, in
lieu of the tax thereby provided for, shall annually
pay to the state for the privilege of exercising their
corporate franchises within this state a tax ac-
cording to or measured by their net income."
Paragraph 2 (b), however, provides:
"The legislature, two-thirds of all the members
elected to each of the two houses voting in favor
thereof, may provide by law for the taxation by
any other method authorized in this constitution
of the corporations, or the franchises subject to
be taxed pursuant to subdivision (a) of paragraph
2 of this section or subdivision (d) of section 14
of this article."
The validity of the 1931 amendment (which was
adopted by the two-thirds vote prescribed in the Con-
14. For a case in which the Franchise Tax Commissioner unsuc-
cessfully attempted to tax a corporation (held by the State Board
of Equalization not to be doing business within the meaning of
the 1929 act), measured by dividends received by it, see In
Matter of Appeal of Boca Land Co. (State Board of Equaliza-
tion, May 11, 1931), Prentice Hall, State and Local Tax Service,
vol. 1, par. 11,082.
687
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stitution), assuming that it provides a different method
of taxing corporate franchises from that expressly set
forth in paragraph 2 (a) of Section 16, and assuming
that paragraph 2b above quoted impliedly limits the
Legislature and makes Section 16 the sole source of
legislative authority to impose taxes on the kind of
corporations referred to therein, will depend upon (1)
whether a corporation which would be taxed under the
amendment was taxable under Article XIII, Section
14 (d); (2) whether this different method is "provided
by law" when done under the guise of defining the
terms of the old method; and (3) whether this new
method "is authorized in" the State Constitution. If
the source of legislative authority to impose this tax
is Section 16 of Article XIII, the amendment as regards
foreign corporations fails to meet the first requirement
and as regards such corporations it is therefore un-
necessary to consider the other two requirements. The
case of People v. Alaska S. S. Co.1" definitely held that
foreign corporations qualified to do intrastate business
in this state but not exercising such right were not
taxable under Section 14d, and, as noted above, taxa-
bility under Section 14d is a condition precedent to
taxability under Section 16.
Foreign corporations doing exclusively interstate
business in the state are of course not subject to a
franchise tax." As to domestic corporations the amend-
ment complies with the first requirement, for the theory
of the old franchise tax as set forth in the cases seems
to support the contention that such corporations were
taxable under Section 14d although not actually doing
15. (1920) 182 Cal. 202, 187 Pac. 742.
16. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts (1925) 268 U. S.
203, 45 Sup. Ct.
688
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business." Assuming that by changing the definition
of terms the Legislature is providing by law for a new
method of taxing corporate franchises, the question
presented by the third requirement is whether this new
method is authorized in the Constitution. What is
meant by "any other method authorized in this con-
stitution"? Do these words mean that the other method
must be expressly set forth in the* Constitution, or
do they refer to any method that is constitutional?
The only methods expressly authorized in the Consti-
tution for the taxation of corporate franchises which
were taxable under Section 14d are the methods set
forth in Section 16 and in Section 14d. The tax
expressly set forth in Section 16 is upon corporations
only that are "doing business". The tax provided in
Section 14d is a property tax and franchises taxable
thereunder must be taxed at their full cash value."
It is arguable whether a tax on the right to do business
can be considered a property tax and whether measur-
ing the value of the right by the net income of the
corporation or by a flat tax of $25 is taxing such
franchises at their full cash value. If the words
"authorized in this constitution" mean "constitutional"
the method employed need not be expressly authorized
in the Constitution and the amendment is within the
authority of the Legislature, for a license tax on the
17. People v. Ford Motor Co. (1922) 188 Cal. 8, 10, 204 Pac. 217, 218;
Miller & Lux v. Richardson (1920) 182 Cal. 115, 187 Pac. 411;
People v. Alaska Pacific S. S. Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 202, 205,
187 Pac. 742. See, also, a direct statement to this effect in The
Matter of the Appeal of Magalia Mining Co. (State Board of
Equalization, January 7, 1930), Prentice Hall, State and Local
Tax Service, vol. 1, par. 11,018.
18. Miller & Lux v. Richardson, supra, note 17; Bank of California
v. San Francisco (1904) 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 100 Am. St.
Rep. 130, 64 L. R. A. 928; Crocker v. Scott (1906) 149 Cal. 575,
37 Pac. 102; Spring Valley Water Works v. Shottler (1882)
62 Cal. 69; San Jose Gas. Co. v. January (1881), 57 Cal. 614.
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right to do business apparently is constitutional.' It
may be argued, however, that this interpretation would
render superfluous the words "authorized in this con-
stitution", for obviously any method of taxation must
be constitutional regardless of express conditions so
stating.
It may be argued that Section 16 does not impliedly
limit the authority of the Legislature to impose other
taxes on corporations, including corporations of the
kind referred to in Section 16; in other words, that
the Legislature has authority independently of that
section to impose the tax contemplated by the amend-
ment.20 Suppose the Legislature desired to impose a
license tax on corporations not taxable under Section
16, e. g., public utilities, insurance companies,21 or indeed
foreign corporations having the right to do intrastate
business in California but not exercising such right,
or desired to impose a license tax in addition to that
contemplated by Section 16 on the corporations taxable
thereunder. That section provides that the tax therein
provided for shall be in lieu of the tax imposed by
Section 14d of Article XIII, but does not state that it
shall be in lieu of any other tax. Likewise, the dif-
19. Kaiser Land Co. v. Curry (1909), 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 34; Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles etc. Co. (1908) 152 Cal. 765, 93 Pac.
1006. Following the decision of the California Supreme Court in
the case of Perkins Manufacturing Company v. Jordan (1927),
200 Cal. 667, 254 Pac. 551, it became apparent that the state could
no longer impose on foreign corporations the annual license tax
based upon the entire amount of their capital stock. (Act of
May 10, 1915, Cal. Stats. 1915, n. 422). Consequently the law
was repealed by the 1927 Legislature (effective July 29, 1927,
Cal. Stats. 1927 c. 221) as to all corporations.
20. Supra note 19.
21. Such additional tax on public utilities and insurance companies
would be invalid, not because in conflict with Section 16 of
Article XIII but because in conflict with Sections 14 (a) and (b)
of that article which provide that the taxes authorized on such
corporations shall be in lieu of all other taxes with certain ex-
pressly stated exceptions it is not necessary here to mention.
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ferent method sanctioned by paragraph 2 (b) of Section
16 is in lieu of the method expressly set forth in Section
16 but is in lieu of no other tax. It would seem rea-
sonable to hold, therefore, that Section 16 applies only
to the particular tax provided for therein, but imposes
no limits on any additional or different tax the Legis-
lature may impose on corporations. According to this
argument a license tax on foreign corporations of the
type mentioned, and on domestic corporations generally,
would be valid under the general legislative authority
and the limitations of Section 16 would have no bearing
upon the validity of the tax. An objection to this
argument in support of the 1931 amendment, assuming
that the Legislature has authority independently of
Section 16 to impose a license tax, may be based on
the insufficiency of the title of the amendment. The
title of the amendment reads as follows: "An act to
amend sections 5, 6, 9, 10, 25, 32, 33 and 35 of the
bank and corporation franchise tax act, approved March
1, 1929, relating to bank and corporation taxes." The
title of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act
referred to in the title just quoted reads as follows:
"An act to carry into effect the Provisions of Section
16 of Article 13 of the constitution. of the state of
California, relating to bank and corporation taxes."
An act which is not passed to carry into effect the
provisions of Section 16 and which is valid only because
not passed under Section 16 is probably not valid under
such a title in view of the requirements of Article IV,
Section 24, of the State Constitution, that "Every act
shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be
expressed in its title. . . ."22
22. See, Treadwell, Constitution of California Annotated, p. 317 et seq.
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692 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS
553. Business Trusts, Partnerships and Joint Stock Associations.
Massachusetts or business trusts are probably not
taxable under the act. "Corporations" only are included
in the terms of Section 16 and in the terms of the
Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act.2 3 The
California Supreme Court has recently recognized busi-
ness trusts as entities distinct from corporations or
partnerships.2 4  Partnerships and joint-stock associa-
tions,2 5 it would seem, are not taxable under the act
for the same reason that business trusts are not taxable
thereunder.
554. Income Reported to Federal Government Is the Basis of the
Computation of the Tax.
The old franchise tax to which the corporations
taxable under the new act were subject was based upon
the corporate excess, i. e., "the difference between the
23. The definition of the term "corporation" given in the act sheds
no light on the problem for it employs the very word it seeks
to define: "Sec. 5. The term 'corporation' as herein used, shall
include every financial corporations, other than a bank or bank-
ing association, and every mercantile, manufacturing and busi-
ness corporation of the classes referred to in subdivision one (c)
of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States."
Under the federal act a trust that operates as a business enter-
prise and is quasi corporate in form, is taxable as a corporation.
Fed. Res. Act 1928, Sec. 701 (a) (2), 704. See Hecht v. Malley
(1924) 265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462; Hemphill v. Orloff (1928)
277 U. S. 437, 48 Sup. Ct. 577; cf Crocker v. Malley (1919) 249
U. S. 223, 39 Sup. Ct. 270; Rottschaefer, Massachusetts Trust
Under Federal Tax Law (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 305.
24. Goldwater v. Oltman, 80 Cal. Dec. 382, commented upon in
19 Cal. Law Rev. 42. See also Ex parte Girard (1921) 186
Cal. 718, 200 Pac. 593, which discusses the distinctions be-
tween a trust and a corporation. This case held that business
trusts were subject to the terms of the California Corporate
Securities Act as amended expressly to include "trusts" in the
definition of the term "company" given in the Act. The State
Board of Equalization thought business trusts subject to Section
14(d) of Article XIII, but that the statute did not reach them.
Report of State Board of Equalization for 1923-1924 at page 9.
25. Partnerships are not taxable as corporations under the Federal
Revenue Act but joint stock associations are, Federal Revenue
Act of 1928, Sec. 701(a) (2), Burk Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hop-
kins (1925) 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48.
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value of its outstanding stocks and bonds as determined
by market quotations, the earnings of the company, or
otherwise, and the value of its tangible physical prop-
erties".2 The new franchise tax is computed upon the
basis of the corporation's net income derived from
business done within the state for the year preceding
that for which the tax is levied, and is fixed at the rate
of four per cent.27 Net income is defined in the act as
the gross income less certain deductions allowed.28
The similarity between the gross income and deduc-
tion provisions of the California29 and the federal actso
and the fact that the return prescribed by the franchise
tax commissioner makes the basis of the computation
of the state tax the net income reported to the federal
government, renders the net income which forms the
tax base, except for adjustments to include income not
taxable under the federal law and adjustments to per-
mit deductions not allowed under the federal law, vir-
tually the amount of the net income as reported to the
federal government. These adjustments are considered
in some detail in the following pages.
555. Adjustments; Tax Exempt Interest.
(1) The principal adjustment is the inclusion of
interest received from federal, state, municipal and
other bonds that has not been included as part of the
gross income returned to the federal government. The
requirement of the inclusion of income from tax-exempt
26. Miller & Lux v. Richardson (1920) 182 Cal. 115, 117.
27. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 1-4.
28. Ibid. sec. 7.
29. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 6, 7 and sec. 8 as amended by Cal.
Stats. 1931, c. 64, sec. 1.
30. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, secs. 21, 22, 23.
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bonds" is probably invalid in view of the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Macallen Com-
pany v. Massachusetts,32 in which a similar feature of
the Massachusetts corporate excise tax law was held
unconstitutional. The uncertainty arises from the case
of Educational Films Corporation v. Ward" and from
the possibility that differences between the California
and Massachusetts legislation may be sufficient to dis-
tinguish the Macallen case. In Pacific Company, Ltd.,
v. Johnson,3 4 now before the United States Supreme
Court, the California Supreme Court, relying upon the
Educational Films case, and distinguishing the Macallen
case, upheld the California act as to taxation of interest
from tax-exempt state bonds. 4 a A brief consideration
of the federal cases will perhaps make obvious the com-
plexities of the problem.
The Macallen case held invalid a Massachusetts
excise tax on domestic corporations measured by total
net income purposely levied to reach tax-exempt income
from federal, state, county and municipal bonds. The
purpose to reach such income was found in the fact
31. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, secs. 6, 8.
32. (1929) 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432.
33. (1931) 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170.
34. (1931) 81 Cal. Dec. 519, 298 Pac. 489. In Aberdeen Savings &
Loan Assn. v. Chase (1930) 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536, re-
hearing denied 290 Pac. 697, decided before the decision in
the Educational Films Case, the Washington Supreme Court,
relying upon the Macallen case, held invalid the Washington
franchise tax on banks and financial corporations measured by
net income including income from tax exempt securities. InQuicksafe Mfg. Corp. v. Graham (1930) 161 Tenn. 46, 29 S. W.(2d) 253 the Tennessee Supreme Court held invalid the Ten-
nessee corporate excise tax measured by net income which in-
cluded royalties from patents in the tax base.
34a. According to Article XIII, Sec. 134 of the California Constitu-
tion, all bonds issued by the state, or by any county, city and
county, municipal corporation or district (including school, recla-
mation and irrigation districts) within the state are exempt from
taxation.
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that it was included in general terms by an amendment
to the statute in question, which before the amendment
specifically excluded such income, and from the fact
that such purpose was plainly disclosed by a report of
a special commission to the Massachusetts Legislature.
The court distinguished Flint v. Stone Tracy Com-
pany," Home Insurance Company v. New York," and
other cases" in which similar taxes were upheld, on the
ground that in those cases the tax was not specifically
intended to reach nor aimed at exempt income." The
opinion of the court, in so far as distinguishing the
instant case from the Flint case and other cases is
35. (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342.
36. (1889) 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593.
37. Society for Savings v. Coite (1868) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 594, 18 L.
Ed. 897; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts (1868) 6 Wall.
(U. S.) 511, 18 L. Ed. 907; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts
1868) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 632, 18 L. Ed. 904.
38. It seems rather unfortunate that the court should have chosen
as a test of the validity of these statutes the motive impelling the
Legislature in each particular case. Admittedly the only justi-
fication for condemning any of these statutes is the duty of the
Supreme Court to protect the Federal Government. and its
agencies from burdensome interference by the states. The
application given to the court's test in the instant case, in the
light of the Flint Case, which the court here recognizes as good
law, compels the conclusion that the statute here involved would
have been valid if the state of Massachusetts could have con-
vinced the court that its motives were unimpeachable. But the
statute would have been no less a burden upon the borrowing
power of the Federal Government. In other words there is no
reasonable relation between the test adopted by the court and
the only justification for its application. The court has in
effect adopted a rule of retributive justice. It seems obvious that
a rule adopted in aid of the court's duty to prevent undue bur-
dens on the activities of the Federal Government should turn
upon the seriousness of the burdens rather than upon some fac-
tor varying independently of those burdens. The argument
immediately suggests itself that such statutes may be void in-
dependently of the extent of the burden because of the motive
of their enactment. It seems. fairly safe to say, however, that
there is nothing in the Constitution or elsewhere which com-
pelled the court to hold that the motive of the Legislature has
any bearing whatever upon the validity of these taxes. If a
statute does not impose an undue burden it seems rather dif-
ficult to say that it must nevertheless be held void if the Legis-
lature which enacted it consciously desired to go as far as it
could. See (1929) Calif. L. Rev. 17, 456, 460.
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concerned, apparently makes the measure including
income from statutory tax-exempt local bonds invalid
under the impairment of the obligation of contracts
clause of the Federal Constitution for the same reason
that the inclusion of income from federal bonds is
invalid as an interference with the federal borrowing
power, namely, because of the manifest intent and
purpose in both cases to reach such income."
The Educational Films case held valid the New York
Tax Act, which imposed a corporate franchise tax
measured by net income, including therein, by implica-
tion, royalties from copyrights. The argument of the
39. The court refused to pass upon the validity of a tax on national
banks measured by total net income. "The question with re-
spect to national banks is not identical with that presented in
the Macallen Case for the reason that Congress has consented
to the imposition by the states of this kind of tax on national
banks. However, since it was expressly held in the Macallen
Case that the inclusion of income from Massachusetts county
and municipal bonds in the measure of a tax on domestic cor-
porations was void as impairing the obligation of the statutory
contract of the state by which such bonds were made exempt
from state taxation, it would seem that under similar cir-
cumstances taxation of income of national banks from such
sources would be void for the same reasons regardless of Con-
gressional consent for Congress has no power to permit states
to impair the obligation of contracts. As to the inclusion of
income from Federal securities in the measure of tax on
national banks, Congressional consent raises a different ques-
tion. Many bonds of the Federal Government are issued un-
der statutes exempting them from state taxation. Although
the United States is not expressly forbidden to impair the
obligation of contracts, it was held in the case of Choate v.
Trapp (1912), 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, that the repeal
by Congress of a contractual tax exemption attached to In-
dian lands by act of Congress, thus subjecting the land to
state taxation, was a violation of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment and void. For the same reasons the
Congressional consent given in section 5219 to the states to
tax income of national banks from statutory tax exempt Fed-
eral bonds might be held void. This conclusion would seem
to follow if the court applies to Federal legislation the test ofintent adopted in the Macallen Case. That Congress intendedby the fourth alternative in section 5219 to sanction the reach-ing by the states of income from exempt securities (as a
matter of fact that is the sole reason for having this method
and is the principal distinction between it and the third
afternative which authorizes a direct net income tax on na-
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taxpayer was that Long v. Rockwood" held income
from patents immune from direct state taxation, that
there was no legal difference so far as state taxation
was concerned between royalties from copyrights and
royalties from patents; that to tax either was to tax a
federal instrumentality; that since the Macallen case
held invalid an excise tax which included in its measure
income from a federal instrumentality, the tax in ques-
tion which included in its measure royalties from copy-
rights was likewise void. The court refused to pass
upon the question whether the rule of the patents case
was applicable to royalties from copyrights, applied the
rule of Flint v. Stone Tracy Company and distinguished
the Macallen case on the ground that the New York
tax, unlike the Massachusetts tax, was not aimed at
the income alleged to be exempt, since the New York
statute never excluded income from copyrights and
tional banks) is demonstrated by the report of the Committee
on Banking and Currency submitted to the House of Repre-
sentatives March 11, 1926. It will be recalled that a similar
report before the Massachusetts Legislature was part of the
evidence from which an improper intent was attributed to
that legislature. Evidence parallel to the history of the Mas-
sachusetts legislation, i.e., an amendment removing a prior
specific exclusion of exempt income, however, is not present.
The Federal statute permits for the first time the taxation
of any income of national banks. It might conceivably be
held, however, that although the intent of Congress was im-
proper, and whether or not the state legislature knows of
this improper intent, if the statute which the state enacts in
pursuance of the permission given with an improper intent
is itself passed with a proper intent (that is if it is passed
without the presence of evidence of the kind found in the
Macallen Case from which improper intent is attributed-the
question is simply one of evidence for surely the legislature
must intend to include income actually included), the tax would
nevertheless be valid." Traynor, Taxation Problems in Branch
Banking (1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 767, 772.
For an argument that a tax on national banks measured
by total net income, including income from exempt securities,
may be valid even though such a tax could not be imposed
upon state banks, or manufacturing, mercantile or business
corporations, see (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 81, 114-118, 237-238.
40. (1929) 277 U. S. 142, 38 Sup. Ct. 463.
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since neither before nor after any amendments thereto
was any mention made of copyrights or income there-
from, nor was there anything to suggest that the
Legislature adopted the statute "for the very purpose
of subjecting 'it pro tanto to the burden of the tax' "."
Whether it will be the Educational Films case or the
Macallen case42 that will determine the validity or inva-
lidity of the California act cannot be predicted with
any degree of assurance. It is believed that the Cali-
fornia tax cannot be upheld unless the Macallen case
is overruled or extremely limited. There are, of course,
differences between the Massachusetts and California
41. Educational Films Co. v. Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379, 394, 51
Sup. Ct. 170, 174. It is difficult to see any distinction between
the Massachusetts Act and the New York Act with respect to
royalties from patents and copyrights. Income from such
sources was taxable under the original Massachusetts act (such
royalties were returnable to the Federal Government. Sec.
217(a) (4) of the 1921, 1924, 1926 Revenue Acts and Sec.
212 and 119(a) (4) of the 1928 Act) and the amendment
to the statute in no way affected the treatment of such in-
come-neither before nor after the amendment did the statute
make any mention of patents or copyrights or their royalties
and the same is probably true of the reports of the State Tax
Commission. Thus, under the court's test of intent there is
probably no evidence against the Massachusetts legislation in
this matter. If the Massachusetts Act should be held valid
in this particular, however, it would not mean that the states
may in all cases include royalties from patents and copyrights
in the tax base of franchise taxes measured by net income, nor
that exempt securities on the one hand and patents and copy-
rights on the other are in different classes as regards state
taxation. The court could still consistently hold invalid an act
passed with an improper intent to reach such income.
42. For a discussion of possible distinctions between the Macallen
Case and the Educational Films Case based upon (1) the dif-
ferences between copyrights and bonds; (2) the fact that copy-
rights are not expressly made tax exempt by Congressional
statutes as are many issues of Federal bonds; (3) a consid-
eration of whether the corporation is incorporated for the pur-
pose of obtaining income from exempt sources or whether it
obtains such income as an incident to other corporate pur-
poses, see, Traynor, Taxation Problems in Branch Banking(1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 767, 776-779 including footnote 17 p.
776. See, also, Powell, An Imaginary Judicial Opinion (1931)
44 Harv. L. Rev. 889; Notes (1931) 19 Calif. L. Rev. 541-(1931) 4 So. Calif. Rev. 415.
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statutes, but it is difficult to see how they can form a
sufficient basis for a distinction. In the first place, in
California exempt interest is included in the tax base
for the first time by an entirely new scheme of taxation
instead of by implication as the result of a statutory
amendment removing a specific exemption of such
income. But in the words of Mr. Justice Langdon,
dissenting in Pacific Company, Ltd., v. Johnson, "To
conclude that this fact alone warrants a distinction
between the two cases is to hold that Massachusetts
cannot take in two bites what California can have in
one".4 In the second place, the statutory provisions
by which the exempt income is reached are different,
but the differences seem to show a clearer intent on the
part of the California Legislature than on the part
of the Massachusetts Legislature to reach forbidden
income. The original Massachusetts statute declared
that "net income" was "The net income . . . re-
quired to be returned by the corporation to the federal
government under the federal revenue act . . . less
interest, so required to be returned, which is
received upon bonds, notes and certificates of indebted-
ness of the United States". 4 Income from state, county
and municipal bonds was also excluded, for it was not
required to be returned to the federal government. By
the subsequent amendment, "net income" was defined
as the net income "required to be returned by the cor-
poration to the federal government under the federal
revenue act . . . adding thereto . . . all interest
and dividends not so required to be returned as net
43. (1931) 81 Cal. Dec. 519, 527, 298 Pac. 489, 495.
44. Mass. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 63, sec. 30 (5); Mass. Gen. Stats.
1925, c. 265 sec. 1.
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income". It will be observed that the Massachusetts
act as it now reads and under which the tax was levied
makes no mention of income from exempt securities
45. Mass. Stats. 1929, c. 343, sec. 1A. The court in the Macallen
Case, said with regard to this amendment, "This was a dis-
tinct change of policy on the part of the commonwealth
adopted, as though it had been so declared in precise words,
for the very purpose of subjecting these securities pro tanto
to the burden of the tax." In commenting upon this state-
ment of the court the California Attorney General in the
course of an opinion to the Franchise Tax Commissioner con-
tended that indirect taxation of exempt income is not new in
this state. ". . . for many years prior to the enactment of
the present law franchises of business corporations have been
assessed on the basis of the value of such franchises, and that
in ascertaining and determining the value the board of equal-
ization has taken into consideration non-taxable property as
well as taxable property, and has also taken into considera-
tion gross receipts from all sources. These laws (Cal. Const.,
Art. XIII, sec. 14d, and Cal. Pol. Code 3664(d) franchise tax
based on corporate excess) recognize the fact that certain
property is or may be exempt from taxation, but the policy
of the state in taxing the franchise of the owner of such non-
taxable property is that all such property must be reported
and duly considered in ascertaining and determining the value
of such franchise." Prentice Hall, State and Local Tax Serv-
ice, vol. 1, par. 11,021. The State Board of Equalization which
evaluated the franchises subject to the old franchise tax has
denied that it took non-taxable property into consideration in
the evaluation of such franchises. In the course of its opinion
in Matter of Appeal of Vortox Manufacturing Co. (August
4, 11, 1930) Prentice Hall, State and Local Tax Service, vol.
1, par. 11,045, the Board declared, "Analyzing the former
tax on general corporate franchises assessed under Section
3664(d) of the Political Code, the Franchise Tax Commis-
sioner has attempted to show that under it the tax exempt
property of corporations was actually included in the value of
the corporate franchises as ascertained by our Board. This
reveals a lack of understanding of what constitutes the value
of a corporate franchise, because the constitutional and statu-
tory provisions under which we proceeded certainly did not
contemplate that the franchise value of corporations would beincreased through their ownership of exempt property. In
arriving at the worth of a corporate franchise we were re-quired to ascertain the total worth of the corporation through
the known value of its stock and bonds, capitalization of its
net earnings or some other accepted method. From this total
corporate worth we deducted the intrinsic value of its assets,incliding tax exempt property, in order that we might arrive
at the corporate 'excess,' which had been established as theproper basis for franchise assessment. (Miller & Lux v. Rich-
ardson, 182 Cal. 115.) Certainly this 'corporate excess' orfranchise value could not be said to include the value oftax exempt property."
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but includes such income in general terms along with
other income not required to be returned to the federal
government. In the California act the Legislature
specifically included in its definition of "gross income"
"all interest received from federal, state, municipal or
other bonds"." Net income is defined as "gross income
less the deductions allowed"," but no deduction is
allowed for exempt interest included in the definition
of gross income. It is obvious from a mere reading
of the California act, without the necessity of an exam-
ination of its relation to prior acts or to the federal
revenue act, as in Massachusetts, that the Legislature
specifically intended to reach exempt income. The
California statute expressly includes specifically men-
tioned exempt income in the tax base, the Massachu-
setts statute only inferentially and by implication
reaches such income. Any difference, it would seem,
would be in favor of the Massachusetts legislation. In
the third place, the report of the California Tax Com-
mission, which was before the Legislature when it
enacted the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act,"
46. Cal Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 6.
47. Ibid. sec. 7.
48. The following quotations from the Final Report of the California
Tax Commission, March 5, 1929, demonstrate clearly that the
purpose of "a measured by" net income tax on banks and
corporations was to reach tax exempt income. In recommend-
ing the fourth alternative of section 5219, a tax according to or
measured by net income rather than the third alternative
of section .5219, a direct tax on net income, the Commission
declared: "The third method may be discarded in favor of
the fourth, because under the fourth everything can be accom-
plished which may be gained by proceeding under the third,
and presumably more besides, viz., the inclusion, if desired, of
tax exempt interest in the base." Final Report of Tax Com-
mission (March 5, 1929) 264. Continuing its discussion at page
276, the Commision stated, "As has been pointed out, the 1926
amendment to section 5219 was drafted with the avowed ob-ject of permitting the inclusion in the tax base of such income
as the interest from tax-exempt bonds. The point, however,
has not been adjudicated and suit (The Macallen Company
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contains in substance the same observations on the
possibility of reaching exempt securities as did that
before the Massachusetts Legislature, which is quoted
by the court" in the Macallen case as showing an
intention to tax them by indirection.
It would seem, however, that whatever may be the
status of interest from tax-exempt bonds, under the
decisions as they now stand royalties from patents and
copyrights may properly be included in the tax base
in California. It is difficult to see how the California
act in this respect differs essentially from the New
York act5 o upheld in the Educational Films case.
Neither the statute nor the report of the Tax Com-
mission anywhere specifically mention patents or copy-
rights or their royalties, nor is there anything present
in the California situation different from that in New
York to suggest that the Legislature adopted the stat-
ute " 'for the very purpose of subjecting' " exempt
royalties " 'pro tanto to the burden of the tax' ".5
(2) The state act also differs from the federal in its
treatment of dividends from stocks. Under the federal
act corporations, with certain exceptions not necessary
v. Massachusetts) has already been filed in Massachusetts
questioning the right of a state to include such interest.
"In the case of corporations other than banks, the point
is not of vital importance. But the banks hold such large
quantities of these tax-exempt bonds that the effect of a deci-
sion holding that the state may not include them in the base
would be very serious indeed. An analysis .of the replies of
the banks to the Commission's questionnaire indicates that the
non-inclusion of Federal bond interest would reduce the tax-
base of the banks approximately one-fourth and the non-
inclusion of all interest exempt from the Federal income tax
would reduce that base by more than one-half."
49. (1928) 279 U. S. 620, 50 Sup. Ct. 14.
50. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 385, sec. 209.
51. (1931) 282 U. S. 379, 394, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 174. See supra
note 41 for a consideration of the taxability of royalties from
patents and copyrights under the Massachusetts Act.
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to note here, are allowed to deduct from gross income
the amount received as dividends from domestic cor-
porations and from any foreign corporation more than
fifty per cent of whose gross income for the threelyear
period ending with the close of its taxable year preced-
ing the declaration of such dividends was derived from
sources within the United States.52
The California act provides that all dividends shall
be included in gross income," but allows a deduction
for dividends out of income arising from business done
in California as such income will have been or will be
reached through the dividend-paying corporation." The
act provides, however, that "if the income out of which
the dividends are declared is derived from business
done within and without this state, then so much of
the dividends shall be allowed as a deduction as the
amount of the income from business done within this
state bears to the total business done", the burden being
upon the taxpayer to show that the dividends not
reported were paid from income earned within Cali-
fornia."
The act as amended in 1931 provides that dividends
which are not allowed as a deduction in the manner
described in the preceding paragraph "shall be subject
to allocation". 56 Prior to this amendment three differ-
52. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 23(p).
53. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 6.
54. Ibid. sec. 8(h).
55. Ibid. This proportion may be determined by securing the requisite
information from the dividend-paying corporation and applying
the same allocation formula to the amount of dividends paid dur-
ing the taxable year that was applied in computing the franchise
tax of the dividend-paying corporation.
56. "Income from intangible personal property which is not deductible
under the provisions of sub-section (h) of section 8 hereof shall
be subject to allocation." Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066, sec. 1, amend-
ing Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 10. Subsection (h) of section 8
provides that in computing "net income" a deduction shall be
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ent rulings on this subject were given by the franchise
tax commissioner. The first ruling of the commis-
sioner required the return in the case of all corpora-
tions of the full amount of such dividends as California
income not subject to the prescribed allocation formula.
This ruling was later modified and under a second
ruling corporations doing business in California and
elsewhere were required to allocate only a portion of
such dividends to California, according to the same
formula by which a portion of their total income from
business was allocated to this state." The third and
apparently the present ruling requires all dividends
representing non-California business received by domes-
tic corporations to be returned as income attributed to
California and permits the entire exclusion of such
dividends from the tax base of foreign corporations
allowed for" (h) Dividends received during the taxable year
from income arising out of business done in this state; but if
the income out of which the dividends are declared is derived
from business done within and without this state, then so much
of the dividends shall be allowed as a deduction as the amount
of the income from business done within this state bears to
the total business done."
See infra, p. 762, for discussion of the general problem of alloca-
tion.
57. A substantially similar treatment of such dividends was pre-
scribed by a provision of the New York franchise tax on cor-
porations (Sections 208 and 214 of N. Y. Tax Law, N. Y.
Laws 1917, c. 726), amended in 1918 (N. Y. Laws 1918, cc.
276, 417) and was declared unconstitutional by the New York
Court of Appeals in People ex rel Alpha Portland Cement
Co. v. Knapp (1920) 230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202. The
statute provided that in case the entire business of the cor-
poration was not transacted within the state, the tax should
be based on the proportion of net income allocated to the
state, which was to bear the same ratio to the entire net in-
come as the aggregate of specific assets within the state bore
to the aggregate of such assets wherever situated; other assets
were disregarded. The allocation scheme took no heed of in-
vestments in bonds, similar intangibles, nor investments in
shares of other corporations except within a prescribed limit
of 10%. It was held that to include the total dividends from
stock in the net income on which the tax was computed but to
disregard the stocks in the allocation fraction save as to the
10% limit rendered the statute unconstitutional.
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whose principal place of business is not in California,
unless they are paid from securities used to finance
business in California, in which case they are all attrib-
uted to California." In other words, if the securities
have a situs here the income therefrom is treated as
California income.
A brief discussion of some of the legal problems
raised by the statutory provisions regarding the inclu-
sion of dividends in the tax base will indicate in some
degree the nature of the difficulties and complexities
confronting the franchise tax commissioner.
Section 8 (h) of the act seems plainly to provide
that all dividends declared out of income derived from
business done without this state shall be treated as
taxable income and included in the tax base regardless
of whether the taxpayer is a foreign or a domestic
corporation." The 1931 amendment referred to above
(providing that dividends not derived from California
business "shall be subject to allocation") was appar-
ently designed to modify the broad provisions of Sec-
tion 8 (h) and to provide that only dividends properly
attributable to California should be considered taxable
income.
As applied to domestic corporations the statute as
58. Opinion of Attorney General to Chairman, Committee on Con-
stitutional Amendments, April 2, 1931. Prentice Hall, State
and Local Tax Service, vol. 1, par. 11,076.
59. In section 6 of the Act (Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 6) it is
provided that "The term 'gross income' as herien used includes
. . . except as hereinafter otherwise provided, all dividends
received on stocks." Section 8 of the Act provides, "In com-
puting 'net income' the following deductions shall be allowed
(h) Dividends received during the taxable year from
income arising out of business done in this state; but if the
income out of which the dividends are declared is derived from
business done within and without this state, then so much of
the dividends shall be allowed as a deduction as the amount
of the income from business done within this state bears to
the total business done."
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interpreted under any of the three rulings mentioned
seems clearly valid. In Maguire v. Trefryso the United
States Supreme Court held that Massachusetts could
constitutionally tax a resident beneficiary on income
received from a trust, the corpus of which consisted of
bonds and certificates of non-Massachusetts debtors held
by the trustee, apparently a non-resident of Massachu-
setts. It is not certain from the court's opinion what the
precise theory was on which the decision was based.
There is language to the effect that the Massachusetts
tax was on persons "measured by" their net income,
it being immaterial that the income came from extra-
territorial sources. There is somewhat stronger lan-
guage, however, that the tax was on a property interest
which had its situs in Massachusetts. Either proposi-
tion would justify a state tax on a domestic corpora-
tion's net income which included dividends from stocks.
If a tax on a resident individual measured by his net
income including income from extraterritorial sources
is valid, a tax on a domestic corporation measured by its
net income including income from the same sources is
probably valid. If jurisdiction over the property from
which the income is derived gives jurisdiction to tax the
income, or, in other words, if income gets a situs for
purposes of taxation from the situs of the property"
from which it is derived, it would seem that California
has jurisdiction to tax dividends received by domestic
60. (1920) 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, Cf. Hill v. Carter (C. C.
A. 9th, 1931) 47F (2d) 869. See also Safe Deposit and Trust
Co. v. Virginia (1929) 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59.
61. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S.
601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, which held that a Federal tax on the
income from property was the same in legal effect as a tax
on the property, is perhaps persuasive authority for the propo-
sition that jurisdiction to tax income from property depends
upon jurisdiction to tax the property.
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corporations because of stock ownership in other cor-
porations. On the theory of mobilia sequunter per-
sonam, which, as applied to intangibles, seems to be
gaining great favor with the United States Supreme
Court," the stocks on which the dividends were de-
clared would have a situs here at the domicile of the
corporation.63 Somewhat similar is the theory that the
dividends when declared become a debt and have a
situs at the domicile of the creditor, in this case the
domicile of the corporation to whom declared.64
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld a fran-
chise tax on a domestic corporation measured by total
capital stock, instead of merely by capital employed
within the state.65 If such a tax is valid it is difficult
62. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930) 280 U. S.
205, 50 Sup. Ct. 98; Baldwin v. Missouri (1930) 281 U. S. 586,
50 Sup. Ct. 436; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission
(1930) 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54; First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine (1932), 52 Sup. Ct. 174.
63. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (1879) 100 U. S. 491 (bond); Hawley v.
Malden (1914) 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201 (shares of stock);
Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville (1917) 245 U.
S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (bank deposit); Citizens Nat. Bank v.
Durr (1921) 257 U. S. 99, 42 Sup. Ct. 15 (stock exchange
seat); Blodgett v. Silberman (1928) 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct.
410 (United States bonds, partnership interest) and cases cited
supra note 62.
For statements that the domicile of a corporation is in the
state of incorporation see Insurance Co. v. Francis (1870) 11
Wall. (78 U. S.) 210, 216; Boyett v. Preston Motors Corporation,
et al. (1921) 206 Ala. 240, 89 So. 746; cases collected in
Beale, The Law of Foreign Corporations (1904) 121; 14 C. J.
338, 14A C. J. 1224; 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations
(1917) 815. The Committee of the American Law Institute
on the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws has adopted this
rule, 1 Conflict of Laws Restatement (Am. L. Inst. 1930)
sec. 42. For an article challenging the existence of this rule
and arguing that the concept of domicile of a corporation
should be abandoned, see Joseph Francis, The Domicile of a
Corporation (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 335. See also (1928) 42
Harv. L. Rev. 262.
64. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission (1930) 282 U. S. 1,
51 Sup. Ct. 54.
65. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Ry. v. Botkin (1916) 240
U. S. 227, 36 Sup. Ct. 261; Memphis & Birmingham R. R. v.
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to see on what grounds a tax measured by total net
income, including dividends from stocks in other corpo-
rations, can be held invalid. In one case the tax on the
franchise is measured by the extent of the privilege
exercised, specifically, capital stock outstanding; in the
other, by the fruits of the privileges exercised, namely,
net income.66
As applied to foreign corporations the statute and
the rulings thereunder raise a very difficult problem.
To include in the tax base dividends received by foreign
corporations on stocks in other foreign corporations
which have no relation to business carried on in this
state, the stocks not being used to finance business in
Stiles (1916) 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58. See, also, Roberts
and Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson (1926) 271 U. S. 50, 46 Sup. Ct.
375, Note 40 Harv. L. Rev. 139 (1926); Cf. New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment (1929)
280 U. S. 338, 50 Sup. Ct. 111.
66. See (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 232 et seq. for a brief analysis of
the "measured by" theory of taxing corporate franchises. See
also, Powell, Business Taxes and the Federal Constitution
(1925) 18 Proc. Nat. Tax Assn. 164. The classic treatment
of the subject is in Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Fed-
eral Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States (1918)
31 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 572, 721, 932, (1919) 32 id. 234, 634, 902.
An objection to the inclusion of dividends representing non-
California business in the measure may be raised because
of the double taxation resulting therefrom due to the fact
that the shares of stock on which the dividends are paid
will be subject to personal property taxes by the city and
county in which the corporation holding them is located.
Subdivision 4 of Sec. 16 providing for the taxation of notes,
debentures, shares of capital stock, etc., provides that "Said
tax shall be in lieu of all other property taxes thereon .. o."
(emphasis added). If an income tax is a property tax, and it
may reasonably be argued that it is (Pollock v. Farmer's Loan
& Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912), dividends
from shares of stock could not be taxed under an income
tax in this state. Even though it be held that dividends may
not be taxed as income it may be argued that as the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act does not impose an income
tax but a franchise tax measured by net income the question
is settled by the holding and reasoning of the court in Pacific
Ltd. Co. v. Johnson (1931) 81 Cal. Dec. 519, 298 Pac. 489,
that non-taxable income may be included in the measure of
such a tax.
FRANCHISE TAx ACT
this state, would seem to be an attempt on the part of
the state to reach income beyond its jurisdiction."
However, the fact that the California tax is not a
direct net income tax but a franchise tax measured by
net income will have an important bearing upon this
problem. A franchise tax on a foreign corporation
owning property in and out of the state measured by a
portion of the corporation's total capital stock allocated
on the basis of business done or property owned in
the state has been approved by the United States
Supreme Court.6 7a If total capital stock which repre-
sents to some extent extraterritorial property may be
apportioned to the state for the purpose of a franchise
tax, it is arguable that total net income, which repre-
sents to some extent extraterritorial income, may like-
wise be apportioned to the state for such purposes.
If jurisdiction to tax income depends upon jurisdic-
tion to tax the property from which the income is
derived, dividends received by foreign corporations
from stocks in other foreign corporations, except as
noted in the following paragraph, are probably beyond
the taxing jurisdiction of the state. No case has
been found in which shares of stock are given a tax
situs in a state simply because the non-resident did
67. See supra note 57 and the more detailed discussion of the gen-
eral problem of allocation infra p. 762, and see also the fol-
lowing cases: Hans Rees' Sons. v. North Carolina (1931) 283
U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, note, 40 Yale L. J. 1273; Standard
Oil Co. of Indiana v. Toreson (C. C. A. 8th 1928) 29F (2)
708; StandardOil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax Commission
(1929) 197 Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85; People ex rel Monjo v.
State Tax Commission (1926) 218 App. Div. 1, 217 N. Y.
Supp. 669. See also Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income
for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1080.
67a. New York v. La. Trobe (1929) 279 U. S. 421, 49 Sup. Ct. 377;
International Shoe Co. v. Shartel (1929) 279 U. S. 429, 49
Sup. Ct. 308. See also Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson(1922) 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 305; Western Cartridge Co.
v. Emmerson (1930) 281 U. S. 511, 50 Sup. Ct. 383.
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business in the state. The same conclusion would prob-
ably be reached even if it be held that a state may tax
a resident individual's total net income, including income
derived from property having a situs outside the state,
on the theory that the tax is on resident persons "meas-
ured by" their net income. The foreign corporation is
in the state only with respect to the business it does in
the state. As to dividends received by it from foreign
corporations and derived from business done outside
the state it can hardly be said that it receives them in
its aspect of a person doing business in the state. In
other words, it would seem that its personality may be
said to be projected into the state only with respect to
business done therein.
If, however, the stocks are used to finance business
in this state or otherwise used as ancillary to business
here, or in other words have acquired a "business
situs" in this state, then, under the decisions as they
now stand, the state perhaps has jurisdiction to tax
the dividends received therefrom. While there are
apparently no decisions specifically to the effect that
shares of stock may acquire a business situs. National
Leather Company v. Massachusetts" suggests that they
may, and a long line of cases holds that other intan-
gibles, from which it is difficult to distinguish shares
of stock, may acquire such a situs."
68. (1928) 277 U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 534.
69. New Orleans v. Stempel (1899) 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct.
110; Bristol v. Washington County (1900) 177 U. S. 133, 20
Sup. Ct. 585; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bd.
of Assessors (1911) 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550; Rogers v.
Hennepin County (1916) 240 U. S. 184, 36 Sup. Ct. 265. See
Powell, Business Situs of Credits (1922) 28 W. Va. L. Q. 89;
Peppin, Taxation of Intangibles (1930) 18 Calif. L. Rev. 638,
notes 16, 65.
See Miami Coal Co. v. Fox (1931 .... Ind. , 176 N. E.
11 (note, 1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1198) which held that where
the bills and accounts receivable of a domestic corporation
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Dividends received by foreign corporations from
stocks in California corporations declared out of earn-
ings from non-California business present another
question. California is apparently without power to
tax such dividends (if jurisdiction to tax dividends
from shares of corporate stock depends upon jurisdic-
tion to tax the shares) in view of the case of First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine."o It was there held
that the state of Maine had no jurisdiction, because of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, to impose a tax upon the transfer by death
of shares of stock in a Maine corporation forming part
of the estate of a non-resident decedent. There can be
no doubt that had the case involved a property rather
than a succession tax on the shares the result would
have been the same.7
In order to reach all the dividends received by
foreign corporations doing business in California,
could the state rely upon the doctrine that the tax
had acquired a business situs in another state they were
not within the taxing jurisdiction of the state of domicile of
the corporation.
70. Supra, note 62.
71. See Corry v. Baltimore (1905) 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297,
which upheld a tax on the shares of non-residents by the state
of incorporation. The court relied, however, upon the fact that
the state in creating the corporation provided for the taxation
in the state of all its shares whether held by residents or non-
residents. This case although not expressly overruled is prob-
ably no longer law. If shares of stock have a situs at the
domicile of their owner and not in the state of incorporation in
the absence of a business situs there, a condition attached to the
granting of a corporate charter that all the shares including those
owned by non-residents shall be subject to taxation by the state
of incorporation would seem to be in the nature of an uncon-
stitutional condition and void. Terral v. Burke Construction Co.
(1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188; Hanover Fire Insurance
Co. v. Harding (1926) 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179; M. H.
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
879. See also Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (1873) 19 Wall.
(U. S.) 490, 22 L. Ed. 189 discussed in 15 Minnesota L. Rev. 770
and Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm. (1931) 283
U. S. 297, 51 Sup. Ct. 436, note 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1300.
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is on the franchise or privilege of the foreign
corporation to do business in this state and may
be measured by its net income without regard to
source? At one time it could be declared without
reservation that if the subject taxed, for example the
privilege of doing business, was within the jurisdiction
of the state, the tax could be measured by elements
themselves not taxable.72 But under the existing law,
a franchise tax on a foreign corporation measured by
extraterritorial values without apportionment is prob-
ably invalid." If a state cannot measure an excise tax
on foreign corporations by property outside the state
and if jurisdiction to tax income from property depends
upon jurisdiction to tax the property, it follows that
dividends from stocks which have a situs outside the
state cannot be included without allocation" in the
measure of such a tax. This conclusion is very undesir-
able as regards foreign corporations which are foreign
in name only (corporations all of whose business is
done in one state and whose charter is obtained in
another state) if all the dividends received by domestic
corporations have their situs in the state of incorpora-
72. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 305, 12
Sup. Ct. 403.
73. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1910) 216 U. S. 1,
30 Sup. Ct. 190; Looney v. Crane Co. (1917) 245 U. S. 178,
38 Sup. Ct. 85; Locomobile Co. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246
U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 298; Cudahy v. Hinkle (1929) 278 U.
S. 460, 49 Sup. Ct. 204. The fact that the tax in each of the
cases cited was also considered a burden upon interstate com-
merce prevents them from being absolute authorities with re-
gard to foreign corporations engaged exclusively in intra-state
commerce. See also Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day(1924) 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12, in which a franchise tax
measured by total authorized capital stock was held invalid,
the difficulty being that the tax was upon non-existent rather
than upon extra-territorial values as the corporation had no
property outside the taxing state. See Powell, Business Taxes
and The Federal Constitution (1925) 18 Proc. Nat. Tax Ass'n,
164, 179.
74. See supra p. 709.
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tion. The domicile, if it is proper to speak of a cor-
poration having a domicile at all, for purposes of taxa-
tion at least, of such a foreign corporation ought to be
held to be in the state of its principal place of business."
There is no substantial difference between this latter
type of foreign corporations and domestic corporations
to justify the difference in treatment. The state may
avoid the discrimination by exempting dividends re-
ceived by domestic corporations from taxation to the
same extent that dividends received by foreign corpora-
tions are exempt." It is possible also that the state
75. Or, perhaps such corporation should be given a "domicile pro
tanto" in each state in which it does business. An adequate
discussion of this point would require a lengthy article in itself
and can only be suggested here. See Egyptian Delta Land
& Investment Co., Ltd. v. Todd, L. R. (1929) A. C. 1, holding
that the residence of a corporation, whether British or for-
eign, for income tax purposes, is "preponderantly if not exclu-
sively" determined by the place where its real business is car-
ried on. See, also, Lockwood v. U. S. Steel Corp. (1913) 209
N. Y. 375, 103 N. E. 697, holding that where a foreign cor-
poration maintained an office in New York for the transfer
of stock it became pro tanto domiciled in that state and there-
fore could be compelled to transfer the stock on its books to
a transferee of a decedent's executors. For a discussion of
the cases holding that the domicile of a corporation within
the state of its origin is at the location of its principal place
of business, see (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 262, and Gorman v.
Leach & Co., Inc. (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 11F (2d) 454.
See also Francis, The Domicile of a Corporation (1929) 38
Yale L. J. 335.
76. If it be held that the state cannot include in the measure of
the tax on foreign corporations dividends received by such
corporations from stocks held in other corporations, would
the inclusion of such dividends in the measure of the tax on
domestic corporations violate Article XIII, section 15 of the
California Constitution? That section reads: "No corporation
organized outside the limits of this state shall be allowed to
transact business within this state on more favorable condi-
tions than are prescribed by law to similar corporations or-
ganized under the laws of this state." See (1929) 17 Calif. L.
Rev. 456, 482-486, in which this section is analyzed in its
relation to an essentially analogous problem, and an argument
advanced that the validity of the tax on domestic corporations
is not affected by the invalidity of the tax on foreign corpo-
rations. It is uncertain in California whether this section is
self-executing (the statement to the contrary in footnote 94 of
the article just cited is inaccurate). If the California court
construes this provision as the Montana Supreme Court has
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may avoid the discrimination by compelling foreign
construed a like constitutional provision it will be held simply
to prohibit the legislature from affirmatively conferring supe-
rior privileges on foreign corporations. See Uihlein v. Caplice
Commercial Co. (1909) 39 Mont. 327, 102 Pac. 564. In view
of Smith v. Lewis (1930) 211 Cal. 294, 295 Pac. 37, it is not
likely that the tax in question on domestic corporations will
be held invalid under this section. It was held in that case
that the fact that the state could not impose a license tax
measured by total capital stock on foreign corporations en-
gaged in interstate commerce (Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Jordan
(1927) 200 Cal. 667, 254 Pac. 551; see also Mulford v. Curry
(1912) 163 Cal. 276, 125 Pac. 236) did not render the license
tax on a domestic corporation (which apparently was not en-
gaged in interstate commerce and employed no capital outside
the state, although the opinion makes no mention of these
circumstances) invalid as in conflict with Article XII, section
15. In support of its holdings on this point the court simply
said: "But it would be going too far to hold that the state of
California is powerless to require the payment of a revenue li-
cense tax by a domestic corporation merely because it is power-
less to enforce a like measure on property beyond its jurisdiction.
We are satisfied that the situation thus presented is not one
contemplated by the section of our state Constitution invoked
by the defendants." 211 Cal. 294, 300, 295 Pac. 37, 40. This
case might be distinguished if the court wanted to reach a
different result in the instant situation on the grounds (if
such are the facts) that the domestic corporation involved in
the case was engaged in a different kind of business gener-
ally and was not engaged in interstate commerce and was
thus not a "similar corporation" within the meaning of the
constitutional section. It would be unreasonable to construe
the section to mean that all domestic corporations must be
treated equally with all foreign corporations. Such an inter-
pretation would prevent a reasonable classification of corpo-
rations for purposes of taxation or for any other purpose.
Public utility companies are taxed differently from oil com-
panies. - Could a domestic public utility corporation sustain an
objection to the tax according to its gross receipts on the
ground that a foreign oil corporation was taxed according to
its net income? Could a domestic corporation engaged in an
exclusively intra-state business of selling radios object under
this section to a franchise tax because such a tax could not
be imposed on a foreign corporation making sales of radios in
the state which were exclusively in interstate commerce? It
would seem that the words "similar corporations" permit the
state a reasonable degree of freedom in classifying corpora-
tions for particular purposes and under the most reasonably
strict construction simply prohibit classification unfavorable to
domestic corporations on the sole basis of whether the cor-
poration is foreign or domestic. In other words, only if the
foreign corporation is substantially similar to the domestic
will it be disallowed to do business under more favorable con-
ditions. According to this interpretation of the section, how-
ever, if a license tax on a foreign corporation engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce (Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
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corporations to become domestic corporations as a con-
dition to permission to do intrastate business within its
Massachusetts (1925) 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477), or a
franchise tax measured by total capital stock on foreign cor-
porations engaged in both intra- and interstate commerce and
owning property outside the state (Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Hinkle (1929) 278 U. S. 460, 49 Sup. Ct. 204) violates the
Federal Constitution, like taxation upon "similar" domestic
corporations likewise so engaged may be held to violate Article
XII, section 15.
An argument somewhat as follows may be advanced that
the section renders unconstitutional a tax on domestic corpora-
tions that is invalid under the Federal Constitution when im-
posed upon similar foreign corporations. Article XII, section
15, was probably designed to prevent discouraging incorpora-
tion in this state and to guarantee to domestic corporations
at least equality of treatment with similar foreign corporations,
in other words it provides that foreign corporations should en-
joy no advantages in this state not enjoyed by similar domes-
tic corporations. If taxes are imposed upon domestic ocrpo-
rations that cannot be imposed upon foreign corporations of
the same kind the latter, if allowed to do business are ob-
viously doing business within this state on more favorable
conditions. If it be held that the section prohibits such dis-
crimination against domestic corporations what should be done
to remove the discrimination? One alternative is to construe
the provision literally and not "allow" the foreign corporations
to transact business on more favorable terms; and if the Fed-
eral Constitution forbids imposing the burden on such corpora-
tions they must not be allowed to do business at all. As
regards foreign corporations seeking admission for the first
time there are probably no legal difficulties in denying them,
because they cannot be taxed as the state taxes domestic cor-
porations, admission at all. Railway Express Agency v. Vir-
ginia (1931) 282 U. S. 440, 51 Sup. Ct. 201; see Note (1931)
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1111. But foreign corporations that were
doing business in the state before the tax was imposed and
thus within the jurisdiction of the state within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, probably cannot be
ousted, for to oust them and to let domestic corporations of
the same kind continue in business would seem to be a denial
of equal protection of the laws. Southern Ry. Co. v Greene
(1909) 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287; Power Mfg. Co.
v. Saunders (1927) 274 U. S. 490, 47 Sup. Ct. 678. For-
eign corporations admitted after the tax was imposed present
difficulties. It would seem that their admission would be in-
valid for the Legislature would be without power to admit them
for the reason that to do so would be to allow them to trans-
act business in this state on more favorable terms than do-
mestic corporations. The other alternative, and this would
seem to be the only alternative if there are any "similar" for-
eign corporations that cannot be prevented from doing busi-
ness in the state and on whom the tax cannot be imposed, is
to remove the tax on the domestic corporations. It may be
argued against the conclusion in this last instance, however,
that it is not the legislature but the Constitution of the
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limits. The intricacies of this problem, however, can-
not be discussed here.7 7
The above discussion regarding the treatment of
dividends from shares of stock applies as well to inter-
est on bonds and other evidences of indebtedness, except
that as regards income from the latter types of securi-
ties the problem is apparently not complicated by the
amendment to Section 10 providing for the allocation
of dividends. That amendment does not apply to inter-
est on bonds, etc., unless the word "dividends" as used
in Section 8h also covers such interest.7 7 a
556. Stock Dividends and Subscription Rights.
The act makes no specific provision for stock divi-
dends or subscription rights. They are not taxable as
income under the federal act78 and are probably not
taxable under the California act. Section 6 of the state
act includes among the items that must be included in
gross income, "except as hereinafter otherwise provided,
all dividends received on stocks"."7  The exception refers
to the deductions provided by Section 8 (h) discussed
above and has no bearing upon the present question.
United States that is "allowing" such corporations to do busi-
ness here and there is no violation of the section if a superior
power makes effective compliance with the section impossible.
Cf. Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather (1923) 263 U. S.
103, 44 Sup. Ct. 23.
77. See Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation and the Con-
flict of Laws (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 516, and (1928) 26 Mich.
L. Rev. 705; Compulsory Incorporation and the Power to Tax
(1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1111.
77a. See supra note, 56.
78. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 115 (f). The issuance by
the corporation to shareholders of rights to subscribe to new
issues of stock, the rights having an intrinsic value in excess
of the issuing price, is essentially no different from the issu-
ance of a stock dividend. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore (1922) 259 U. S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 483.
79. Italics added. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 6.
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Section 16 of Article XIII of the State Constitution,"
in pursuance of which the act was passed, and Section 4
of the act8 ' contemplate a tax measured by "net income".
California courts might follow the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber"8 that
stock dividends for the purposes of income taxation are
capital and not income, and thus not within the contem-
plation of the constitutional section or statute.
557. Liquidating Dividends.
A somewhat similar question, due to the same ambi-
guity of the act and its failure specifically to cover the
point, may arise in the case of dividends which repre-
sent a distribution of capital, e. g., "liquidating" divi-
dends and dividends from depreciation and depletion
reserves." However, there should be no doubt on this
problem regardless of whether stock dividends are or
are not "income". Surely a return of capital admitted
to be such is not income.
558. Dividends Paid in Property Other Than Cash.
The fact that the dividend is paid in property other
than cash should make no difference if declared out of
earnings or profits of the dividend-declaring corpora-
tion. This is in general the federal rule." Thus, a
distribution from earnings or profits by a corporation
80. Supra note 2.
81. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 4.
82. (1920 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189. For a contrary view see
Trefry v. Putnam (1917) 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 904,
L. R. A. 1917 F 806.
83. Such dividends are exempt under the Federal Revenue Act of
1928, sec. 115 (c), (d).
84 Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 115 (a). Peabody v. Eisner
(1918) 247 U. S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546.
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of anything of value owned by it, e. g., bonds,8 5 shares
of stock in other corporations,8 6 are taxable at their fair
market value at the time of the distribution.
559. Dividends From Earnings Accumulated Prior to Effective
Date of the Act.
Distributions from earnings or profits accumulated
prior to March 1, 1913, are not within the meaning of
"dividends" in the federal revenue act." There is no
such limitation in the California act and it is therefore
immaterial that the dividends are paid out of surplus
accumulated prior to March 1, 1913 (the basic date in
the federal act), or prior to November 6, 1928 (the
date Section 16 of Article XIII was approved by the
peQple), or prior to January 1, 1928 (the basic date
under the California act for determining profit or loss
upon the sale of capital assets and the values upon which
depreciation and depletion are allowable)." An adjust-
ment will be necessary to take care of this difference
in pertinent cases.
85. Including the corporation's own debenture bonds, Doerschuck
v. U. S., and Thomas v. U. S. (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1921) 274
Fed. 739, and Liberty Bonds and other Government securities
T. D. 2512.
86. Peabody v. Eisner, supra note 84. The exceptions in the Fed-
eral practice in the case of corporate reorganizations governed
by section 112 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1928 will be
the same in California as that section of the Federal Act is
incorporated by reference in the California act "with the same
force and effect as though fully set forth" therein. Cal. Stats.
1929, c. 13, sec. 20.
87. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 115 (a).
88. See Lynch v. Hornby (1918) 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543;
Peabody v. Eisner, supra note 84; U. S. v. Guinzberg (C. C.
A. 2d 1921) 278 Fed. 363; Plant v. Walsh (D. C. Conn. 1922)
280 Fed. 722. See also Income Tax on Dividends Declared After
but Paid from Earnings Accrued Before Act Went Into Effect,
L. R. A. 1917 F. 814.
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560. Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies.
(3) Under the statute as it read in 1929 an adjust-
ment was required for the excess of the proceeds of
life insurance policies, covering the life of any officer
or employee, over the premiums paid." This result
was probably not intended by the framers of the act
but was due to the punctuation of the statute which
the commissioner strictly construed against the tax-
payer.o The necessity for this adjustment was removed
by the Legislature in 1931." Under the Federal Rev-
enue Act amounts received under a life insurance con-
tract paid by reason of the death of the insured are
excluded from gross income.92 There is an exception
in the federal act if the beneficiary is a transferee of
the policy for a valuable consideration. In that case
only the actual value of such consideration and the
amount of premiums and sums subsequently paid by
89. Section 9 of the 1929 Act provided: "In computing net income
no deduction shall be allowed for; . . . (c) Premiums paid
on any life insurance policy covering the life of any officer
or employee or of any person financially interested in any
trade or business carried on by a taxpayer, when the tax-
payer is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under such policy,
but the amount received under such a policy by reason of the
death of the insured and amounts received under other life
insurance, endowment and annuity contracts of the type whose
premiums are disallowed, equal to the total amount of pre-
miums paid thereon shall not be included in gross income."
(Emphasis added.) Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 9.
90. This result could have been averted if the emphasized words as
set forth in the section quoted in the preceding note had been
properly set off from the words immediately following.
91. This change was first effected by inserting after the word "but"
in the phrase emphasized in the section as quoted in note 89
above, the word "neither" and substituting the word "nor"
for the word "and" immediately after the emphasized phrase.
Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, sec. 2. By a later amendment, Cal.
Stats. 1931, c. 1066, the Legislature removed the proviso as
amended entirely from section 9 and added to the end of
section 6 a provision specifically excluding from gross income
the two items formerly covered by the exception in section 9.
92. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 22 (b) (1). Reg. 74, Art. 82.
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the transferee are subject to the exemption." The
California act, however, makes no exception where the
beneficiary is a transferee of the policy for a valuable
consideration. It would seem that an adjustment may
have to be made because of this difference. The federal
act also provides that if amounts paid by reason of the
death of the insured are held by the insurer under an
agreement to pay interest thereon, the interest payments
shall be included in gross income." The state statute
has no corresponding provision, but as income received
as interest is included in the statutory definition of
gross income," it would seem that the interest in ques-
tion must be included and that no adjustment is neces-
sary unless the word "amount" as used in Section 6 of
the statute, 96 "the amounts received under life insurance
policies and contracts paid by reason of the death of
the insured [shall not be included in gross income],"
can be interpreted to include interest paid on such
amount. Such an interpretation is very improbable,
since interest on such "amount" is not received "under
such policy" and is not paid by reason of the death of
the insured but by reason of the agreement to pay
interest. Under the federal act amounts received other
than by reason of the death of the insured under a life
insurance, endowment or annuity contract in excess of
the aggregate amount of premiums paid must be in-
cluded in gross income." No adjustment need be made
in the state return for such excess, as the state act also
requires its inclusion in gross income."
93. Ibid. sec. 22 (b) (2).
94. Ibid. sec. 22 (b) (1).
95. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 6.
96. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066.
97. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 22 (b) (2).
98. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066.
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561. Net Losses.
(4) Unlike the Federal Revenue Act (which imposes
a direct tax on net income), the California act (which
imposes a franchise tax measured by net income of the
preceding year) does not permit deductions for net
losses of prior years." An adjustment for this differ-
ence must be made in relevant cases.
562. Adjustment for Taxes.
(5) A further adjustment must be made for fran-
chise taxes paid under the Bank and Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Actoo which are of course not allowed as
deductions, although they are so allowed under the
federal act.' The California act disallows deductions
for taxes on income or profits imposed by any foreign
country or by any state, territory, county, city or other
taxing subdivision. 02  The federal act permits the
deduction of these taxes except those income or profits
taxes imposed by a foreign country which are allowed
as a credit against the federal tax.' This difference
will also require adjustment in pertinent cases. Taxes
99. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 117.
100. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (c), amended, Cal. Stats. 1931,
c. 64, sec. 1.
101. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 23 (c).
102. Supra note 100. With the exceptions noted in the text, the
California act (section 8 (c)), allows a deduction for taxes or
licenses paid or accrued during the taxable year. Franchise
taxes "measured by" net income are probably deductible as
the theory of such acts (to justify the inclusion of tax exempt
income in the tax base), is that the subject taxed is the corporate
franchise and not the income or profits by which the tax is
measured.
The Attorney General has ruled that income taxes paid to
Porto Rico, a possession of the United States, are not deductible
on the ground that such possession is similar to a territory
and thus within the terms of the Act. Prentice Hall, State
and Local Tax Service, vol. 1, par. 11,055.
103. Supra note 101.
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assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to
increase the value of the property assessed are not
deductible under either act, although in both acts the
amounts included for interest or maintenance charges
may be deducted.o' All other taxes, including taxes on
real and personal property paid or accrued during the
taxable year, are deductible under both acts.o' Federal
income taxes are of course not allowed as a deduction
under the federal revenue act. Under the state act as
it read in 1929 a deduction of the entire amount of
federal income tax accrued (as distinguished from
paid) during the taxable year was allowed.o'0 Under
the 1931 amendmentso' the deduction allowance for
federal income taxes accrued during the taxable year
was restricted and the amount of federal tax deductible
is now computed upon the basis of the net income
returned to the federal government less the adjustments
made for state purposes to cover additional deprecia-
tion, depletion, amortization of leasehold, and other
additional deductions based upon valuations established
as of January 1, 1928, and less adjustments arising
from the taxpayer's election to treat installment sales
differently in the state return from in the federal return.
563. Adjustments on Audit of Federal Return.
(6) If adjustments are made on the audit of the
federal income tax return, either by way of additional
income or the disallowance of deductions, the franchise
104. California Act, supra note 100, Federal Revenue Act of 1928,
sec. 23 (c).
105. Ibid.
106. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (c).
107. Cal. iStats. 1931, c. 64, sec. 1.
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tax commissioner requires that such additional income
be included in the state return for the year in which
notice of the additional assessment is made 08 and a
deduction is allowed, apparently in that year, 09 for the
additional federal tax. The commissioner will no doubt
allow a deduction for income which the audit reveals
was improperly included in the federal return or for
additional deductions which that audit shows should
have been allowed in the federal return.
108. See Item 31 of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Re-
turn prepared by the commissioner. Since the tax for a par-
ticular year is measured by the net income of the preceding
year it would be more accurate to file an amended return for
the year covered by the audit rather than to report in the
year in which the audit is made additional .income attributable
to some prior year.
Inasmuch as the act provides that "Except in the case of a
fraudulent return, every notice of additional tax proposed to be
assessed . . . shall be mailed to the taxpayer within one
year after the return was filed and no deficiency shall be assessed
or collected with respect to the year for which such return was
filed unless such notice is mailed within such period, provided
however that in the case of returns filed on or before June 1,
1930, notice of additional tax proposed to be assessed may be
mailed at any time on or before June 1, 1931," (Cal. Stats. 1931,
c. 1066, sec. 5) it is doubtful if this requirement of the franchise
tax commissioner will be very effective unless the federal audit
is made early enough to give the commissioner sufficient time
to mail the proper notice. See infra p. 773.
109. The Act permits the deduction of Federal taxes "accrued" dur-
ing the taxable year. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, sec. 1. Does an
additional tax for one year but assessed in another year
"accrue" in the year assessed? In United States v. Anderson
(1925) 269 U. S. 422, 46 Sup. Ct. 131, the court held that the
tax on munitions manufactured and sold in 1916 was deduct-
ible in 1916 by a taxpayer reporting on the accrual basis
although the tax was not due and not paid until 1917. In
the course of its opinion the court said, "In a technical legal
sense it may be argued that a tax does not accrue until it
has been assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that in
advance of the assessment of a tax, all the events may occur
which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of
the taxpayer to pay it." Under the theory of this case it
would seem that additional assessments "accrue" in the year
for which the deficiency is determined. If this conclusion is
correct an amended return should be filed for that year and
the deduction should not be allowed in the year in which
the assessment is made.
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564. Interest.
(7) According to the state act all interest paid or
accrued during the taxable year is deductible."o Under
the federal act a deduction is allowed for all interest
except interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase tax-
exempt obligations."' An adjustment for the amount of
such interest may be made in the state return as well as
for the amount of the federal tax which a corporation is
required to withhold in the case of interest paid upon
bonds or other obligations issued by the corporation
containing a tax-free covenant which is actually addi-
tional interest but is not allowed as a deduction under
the federal act.112
565. Gains and Losses on Sale of Capital Assets.
(8) Because of the difference in the basic dates in
the two acts adjustments must also be made in the
matter of gains and losses from the sales of capital
assets. Under the federal act the basis for determining
the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of
property acquired after February 28, 1913, is in general
the cost or inventory value thereof, and the basis of
property acquired before March 1, 1913, is the cost of
such property or the fair market value of such property
110, Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (b) amended, Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
64, sec. 1.
111. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 23 (b).
112. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 144 (a) (4). The bond owner
for whom the tax is paid is not required to include the amount
thereof in his gross income. Ibid. The Treasury Regulations,
Reg. 74, Art. 761, provide that "In the case, however, of
corporate bonds or obligations containing an appropriate tax-
free covenant, that the corporation paying for someone else,
pursuant to its agreement, a State tax or any tax other than
a Federal tax may deduct such payment as interest paid on
indebtedness." This regulation seems to conflict with the Fed-
eral statute which provides in section 144 (a) (4) that, "The
obligor shall not be allowed a deduction for the payment of
the tax imposed by this title, or any other tax paid pursuant
to the tax-free covenant clause, . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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as of March 1, 1913, whichever is greater.' Under
the California act the basis of property acquired on or
after January 1, 1928, is the cost or inventory value
thereof, and the basis of property acquired prior to
January 1, 1928, and disposed of thereafter is the fair
market value as of January 1, 1928.""
An interesting problem is presented by the California
statute in instances in which the original cost of the
property, less depreciation actually sustained before
January 1, 1928, is greater than its January 1, 1928,
value and greater than the selling price, but the January
1, 1928, value is less than the selling price. The dif-
ference between the January 1, 1928, value and the
selling price represents a gain for that period, although
on the transaction as a whole there is no gain but in
fact a loss. To include this difference between the
January 1, 1928, value and the selling price in the tax
base as gain or income when as a matter of fact no
gain or income was realized on the investment seems
unjust. Section 16 of Article XIII, in pursuance of
which the statute was passed, and Section 4 of the
statute, contemplate a tax measured by "net income".
These constitutional and statutory provisions may be
interpreted to modify Section 19 of the statute and
prevent the inclusion of items in the measure of the
113. Federal Revenue Act of 1928, secs. 113, 111 (b).
114. "For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived or loss sus-
tained from the sale or other disposition of property, real, per-
sonal or mixed, acquired on or after January 1, 1928, the basis
shall be the cost thereof, or the inventoried value if the in-
ventory is made in accordance with this act, and in the case
of property acquired prior to January 1, 1928, and disposed
of thereafter, the basis shall be the fair market value thereof
as of said date. The basis shall be diminished by the amount
of the deductions for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence
and depletion which have, since the basic date, been allowable
in respect of such property under this act." Cal. Stats. 1929,
c. 13, sec. 19.
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tax which really do not represent income. The Supreme
Court of the United States was. confronted with sub-
stantially an identical problem arising under the Federal
Revenue Act of 1916. That act contained a provision
corresponding to Section 19 of the California act, to
the effect that the basis for the determination of gain
or loss of property acquired before March 1, 1913, was
"the fair market price or value of such property as of
March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen". In Good-
rich v. Edwards"' the taxpayer acquired property in
1912, having a value of $291,600. Its March 1, 1913,
value was $148,635.50. It was sold in 1916 for
$269,346.25, obviously at a loss to its owner. The
court held that although the selling price was greater
than the March 1, 1913, value there was no taxable
gain to the taxpayer. After stating that the act pro-
vided that net income should include "gains, profits and
income", and after quoting the definition of "income"
approved by the court in Eisner v. Macomber"' as
"'the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined', provided it be understood to include
profits gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets", the court declared: "It is thus very plain that
the statute imposes the income tax on the proceeds of
the sale of personal property to the extent only that
gains are derived therefrom by the vendor, and we
therefore agree with the solicitor general that since no
gain was realized on this investment by the plaintiff in
error no tax should have been assessed against him.""'
115. (1921) 255 U. S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct. 390.
116. (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
117. Ibid. See also Walsh v. Brewster (1921) 255 U. S. 536, 41
Sup. Ct. 392, in which the sale price exceeded both the cost
and the 1913 value, but the 1913 value was less than the cost,
but the court approved of a tax only on the actual gain.
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Just as the statute, using as it does without exception
January 1, 1928, as the basic date, raises a question
regarding the inclusion of items as gains when there
has actually been no gain, so also it raises a question
regarding the deduction of losses when there has actu-
ally been no loss. If the selling price was less than the
January 1, 1928, value but equal to or greater than the
cost, the difference between the January 1, 1928, value
and the selling price would represent a loss for that
period, but on the transaction as a whole there would
be no loss, and in fact if the selling price were greater
than cost there would actually be a gain, which accrued,
however, prior to January 1, 1928. The Supreme Court
of the United States was also presented with this prob-
lem. In United States v. Flannery"1 s James Flannery
bought, prior to March 1, 1913, certain corporate stock
for less than $95,175. Its market value on March 1,
1913, was $116,325 and he sold it in 1919 for $95,175,
that is, for more than cost. Flannery died in March,
1920, and his executors in returning his income for
the year 1919 deducted as a loss the difference between
the sale price and the March 1, 1913, value. The
Supreme Court upheld the commissioner of internal
revenue in disallowing the loss claimed. The 1918
Federal Revenue Act, which was applicable to this
situation, contained substantially the same basic date
clause as the 1916 act quoted above. In the course of
its opinion the court said:
"It is clear, in the first place, that the provisions
of the act in reference to the gains, derived and
the losses sustained from the sale of property
acquired before March 1, 1913, were correlative,
118. (1925) 268 U.0 S. 98, 45 Sup. Ct. 420.
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and that whatever effect was intended to be given
to the market value of property on that date in
determining taxable gains, a corresponding effect
was intended to be given to such market value in
determining deductible losses. This conclusion is
unavoidable under the specific language of Section
202 (a) establishing one and the same basis for
ascertaining both gains and losses."
And further on, after referring to Goodrich v. Edwards
and Walsh v. Brewster, the court continued:
"So we think it should be held that the Act of
1918 imposed a tax and allowed a deduction to the
extent only that an actual gain was derived or an
actual loss sustained from the investment, and the
provision in reference to the market value on
March 1, 1913, was applicable only where there
was such an actual gain or loss, that is, that this
provision was merely a limitation upon the amount
of the actual gain or loss that would otherwise
have been taxable or deductible."
These cases seem to stand for the proposition that
if there is a gain' after February 28, 1913, it will be
taxable only to the extent that it represents actual gain
over the whole transaction; and if there is a loss after
February 28, 1913, that portion thereof which repre-
sents actual loss over the whole transaction will be
deductible.
If California should follow these cases in interpreting
the basic date provision of the California statute the
results reached would be just but the plain meaning of
Section 19 of the statute would be altered. So far as
that section is concerned nothing is said about actual
gains or actual losses and it is arguable whether the
728
FRANCHISE TAx ACT
court should add such precepts to the statute, particu-
larly in view of the theory that the statute and consti-
tutional section do not purport to impose a tax on actual
net income but impose a tax on corporate franchises
"measured by" the net income of fixed accounting
periods." If California follows the case just cited in
the margin and an item represents net income within
the fixed accounting period it will be included in the
base regardless of whether or not there was actually
a loss rather than a gain on the particular transaction.
If that be true there should be no great objection to
estimating gain or loss on the sale of capital on the
basis of a fixed period (January 1, 1928, to date of
sale) regardless of actual gain or actual loss.
It is conceivable that in spite of apparent inconsist-
encies such action would involve, as indicated in United
States v. Flannery, the California courts might follow
Goodrich v. Edwards and refuse to follow United States
v. Flannery. In that event they might hold on the one
hand that since the statute and the constitutional section
under which it was passed contemplate a tax measured
by net income, only actual income or actual gains may
be included in the base; and hold on the other hand that
it is entirely a matter of legislative discretion what
deductions are allowed, and as there is no limitation on
deductions in the constitutional section or statute corre-
sponding to the implied limitation that only actual gains
shall be included in the measure, and that as a plain
reading of the basic date provision of the statute allows
the deduction of losses occurring after January 1, 1928,
they should be allowed even though they are offset by
gains which accrued prior to that time-gains which
119. See Burnet v. Sanford & B. Co. (1931) 282 U. S. 359, 363, 51
Sup. Ct. 150.
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according to the plain intent of the statute are not to
be considered.' 20
The California act is seriously defective in omitting
provisions on several matters of importance regarding
the determination of gain or loss on the sale of capital
assets that are covered by the federal act. The signifi-
cant instances in which the California act differs from
the federal in this regard have been well summarized
as follows:
"A. The amount to be compared with the basis
for the purpose of ascertaining gain or loss is not
defined. Obviously, however, this figure must be
the amount received or the 'amount realized' as
defined in the Federal Act.
120. Both the Federal statutes involved in the above cases and the
California statute prevent the taxation of gains that accrued
prior to the basic date although realized thereafter. There
is some doubt as to the power of Congress to impose an in-
come tax under the Sixteenth Amendment on gains which
accrued prior to March 1, 1913 (or rather February 25, 1913,
the date the Sixteenth Amendment was formally proclaimed
to be adopted) even though realized thereafter. See Lynch
v. Turrish (1918) 247 U. S. 221, 38 Sup. Ct. 537, which did
not pass on the constitutional question but held such gains
were not income "arising or accruing" within the taxable year
within the meaning of the Revenue Act of 1913 which con-
tained no basic date provision limiting the tax to gains ac-
cruing after February 28, 1913, as did the 1916 and later
Revenue Acts. (With regard to the constitutional question
compare Towne v. Eisner (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct.
158, and Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup.
Ct. 189. See also, however, Lynch v. Hornby (1918) 247 U.
S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543). The power of a state to tax income
realized after the passage of an income tax statute, although
such income represents gain which accrued prior thereto, is
less doubtful. See Norman v. Bradley (1931) .... Ga. .. , 160
S. E. 413.
The basic date provisions in the state statute and the Fed-
eral statutes involved in the above cases seem also to prevent
the deduction of losses sustained before the basic date. In
the Matter of Appeal of San Christina Investment Co. (Au-
gust 4, 1930) Prentice Hall, State and Local Tax Service,
vol. 1, par. 11,050, the State Board of Equalization denied the
claim of one of the appellants that the Commissioner shouldhave considered the actual cost of the real property acquired
by it in 1914, less depreciation written off between 1914 and
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"B. No provision is made for adjustments on
account of expenditures and other items properly
chargeable to capital account. But as good ac-
counting practice calls for this method of keeping
the books, there should be no objection to following
this practice in making the franchise tax return.
However, no adjustment will be necessary for
expenditures made prior to January 1, 1928, as
presumably they will be reflected in the inventory
value of the capital assets made as of that date.
"C. Under the Federal Act the amount by
which the basis is to be diminished with reference
to depletion may not exceed a depletion deduction
computed without reference to the discovery value
in the case of mines or to percentage depletion in
the case of oil and gas wells. This limitation is
not included in the California Act and the basis
must be diminished by the full amount of depletion
1928, as the basis for the determination of the loss sustained
upon the sale of the property in 1928. In Smith v. Nichols
(D. C. Mass. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 629, however, which involved
the Revenue Act of 1916, the court allowed the deduction of
a loss which was entirely sustained before March 1, 1913. The
March 1, 1913, value was lower than the cost and the selling
price was also lower than cost but greater than the March 1,
1913, value, thus part of the loss which occurred prior to
March 1, 1913, was in fact offset by gains occurring after that
date, but the court held that the deductible loss was the differ-
ence between the cost and the selling price. This decision
seems to be clearly contrary to the plain intent of the statute
and unwarranted by the Supreme Court cases above dis-
cussed and its reasoning should not be followed in interpret-
ing the state act.
The present Federal Revenue Act (Revenue Act of 19Z8,
sec. 113 (b) and the Revenue Acts of 1924 (sec. 204 (b))
and 1926 (sec. 204 (b)) settle all these problems in favor of
the taxpayer, allowing him to deduct the greatest possible
loss and taxing him on the least possible gain. That Act
(sec. 113 (b)) provides: "The basis for determining the gain
or loss from the sale or other disposition of property acquired
before March 1, 1913, shall be: (1) the cost of such property
. or (2) the fair market value of such property as of
March 1, 1913, whichever is greater."
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deductions that have been allowable in respect to
such property. The advantage, of course, lies with
the procedure under the Federal Act in limiting
the amount of reduction that may be made in the
basis. On the other hand, it is manifestly not
unfair to require the diminution of the basis by
the full amount of deductions of which the tax-
payer has had the benefit. The situation will not
be materially affected where the proven value of
the property has been established prior to January
1, 1928, but where the fair market value of the
property as the result of discoveries subsequent to
January 1, 1928, is greatly disproportionate to the
value as of that date or to the cost if purchased
subsequent to January 1, 1928, the disadvantage to
the taxpayer will be apparent.
"D. As no other value is to be used as the basis
except that of January 1, 1928, it is, of course,
unnecessary to provide for any adjustment on
account of exhaustion, obsolescence and depletion
sustained prior to that date. These factors will
have been taken into consideration in establishing
the January 1, 1928, value.
"E. In the case of stock, the Federal Revenue
Act provides that the basis shall be diminished by
the amount of distributions received, to the extent
provided under the law applicable to the year in
which the distribution was made. Section 115 of
that Act covers in detail the subject of distribu-
tions by corporations, defining dividends, the source
of distributions, distributions in liquidation and
other distributions out of capital. No analogous
provisions are found in the California Act. The
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taxpayer must determine what procedure should
be followed in classifying distributions other than
ordinary dividends for the purposes of the fran-
chise tax.
"Distributions of this class may include those
made out of surplus resulting from an apprecia-
tion in assets prior to January 1, 1928, distribu-
tions out of depletion and depreciation reserves
and other distributions not out of an increase in
value of property accrued prior to January 1, 1928,
or not out of earnings and profits. The logical
procedure would be to follow the practice under
the Federal Act and apply such distributions in
reduction of the basis of the stock, any excess over
such basis being taxable as a gain from the sale
or exchange of property." 12 1
If California follows the rule in Eisner v. Macom-
berl 22 and holds that stock dividends are not "income"
within the meaning of the statute, the problem will
arise of determining the basis of the old stock or of
the dividend stock if either is sold thereafter. The act
fails to provide for this matter. If the theory pursued
in the federal practicel 23 is followed the basis of such
stock may be determined by dividing the January 1,
1928, value, or if the stock was acquired after that
date, the cost thereof, by the total number of shares
after the stock dividend.
Under the federal act subscription rights, assuming
their intrinsic value to have exceeded the issuance price,
are considered essentially analogous to stock divi-
121. Prentice Hall, State and Local Tax Service, vol. 1, par. 3435,
pp. 3018-3019.
122. (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
123. Reg. 74, Arts. 628 and 600 (1).
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dends. 24 In the absence of any provision in the state
act regarding the determination of gain or loss on the
sale of stock rights, or the sale of the stock with respect
to which such rights were issued, or the sale of stock
acquired by exercise of the rights, the taxpayer should,
as in the case of stock dividends, follow the methods
of determinihig gain or loss provided in the Federal
Treasury Regulations,' 25 using, however, the January
1, 1928, value for stock acquired prior to that date.
Profits derived from the purchase and sale of tax-
exempt securities are taxable under the federal act. 1 25 a
They are likewise taxable under the California actl2 5b
and thus no adjustment for them will be required.
566. Corporate Reorganizations.
No adjustment is necessary in the case of corporate
reorganizations or exchanges of property governed by
Section 112 of the Federal Revenue Act as that section
is incorporated by reference in the California act "with
the same force and effect as though fully set forth"
therein.126  The California act also provides that "when
property is exchanged for other property and no gain
or loss is recognized . . . the property received
124. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore (1922) 259
U. S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 483.
125. Reg. 74, Art. 58. The method prescribed by the present Treas-
ury Regulations does not follow the method set forth in
Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, supra, note
113. It is believed that the method sanctioned in the Miles
case is not consistent with the method of determining the
basis in the case of stock dividends and -that the present
Treasury Regulation is a fairer method of determining the
basis of subscription rights. It is not possible here to enter
into a discussion of the relative merits of these methods.
125a. (1931) 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125.
125b. Pacific Co. Ltd. v. Johnson (1931) 81 Cal. Dec. 519, 298 Pac. 489.
126. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 20.
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shall be treated as taking the place of the property
exchanged therefor."1 27
567. Installment Sales.
The act also provides that "in the case of installment
sales the taxpayer may elect to proceed in the manner
provided in Section 44 of the said revenue act of 1928,
in which case the taxpayer shall account for profits on
installments received subsequent to December 31, on
sales made prior thereto. If the taxpayer elects to
proceed otherwise, the transaction will be deemed to
have been closed when the sale was made."1 28
568. Wash Sales.
The California act also follows the federal act in
providi'ng that "in the case of any loss claimed to have
been sustained in any sale or other disposition of shares
of stock or securities where it appears that within
thirty days before or after the date of such sale or
other disposition, the taxpayer has acquired (otherwise
than by bequest or inheritance) or has entered into a
contract or option to acquire substantially identical
property and the property so acquired is held by the
taxpayer for any period after such sale or other disposi-
tion, no deduction for the loss shall be allowed unless
the claim is made by a taxpayer, a dealer in stocks, or
securities, and with respect to a transaction made in
the ordinary course of its business."129
127. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 21.
128. Cal. Stats. 1929, c, 13, sec. 20. See supra, note 107 and text to
which it is appended for treatment of adjustment of federal
income tax and effect of election to return installment sales
differently in each return.
129. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (d), amended, Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
64, sec. 1.
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569. Depreciation and Depletion.
(9) The state act provides that allowance for exhaus-
tion, wear and tear and obsolescence, and, except in
the case of oil and gas wells, for depletion, may be
taken on the same basis as provided in Sections 113
and 114 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1928 or on the
basis of the value of the property as of January 1,
1928."3' An adjustment will be necessary in the state
return if'' the taxpayer elects the latter alternative.
130. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (f) (g), amended Cal. Stats. 1931,
c. 64, sec. 1. The provisions of the Federal Act (Federal
Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 114 (b) (2) as to the use of the
discovery value in the case of mines are copied in the state
act. The California statute provides in part as follows: (1)
"The basis upon which depletion is to be allowed in respect of
any property, except as hereinafter provided for oil and gas
wells shall be as provided in sections 113 and 114 of the said
Revenue Act of 1928, or upon the basis provided in section
19 hereof." (Section 19 provides for the use of January 1,
1928, values as a basis for property acquired prior thereto.)
The statute then copies the Federal Act as follows: (2) "In
the case of mines discovered by the taxpayer after February
28, 1913, the basis for depletion shall be the fair market value
of the property at the date of discovery or within thirty days
thereafter, if such mines were not acquired as the result of
purchase of a proven tract or lease, and if the fair market
value of the property is materially disproportionate to the
cost." In the case of mines discovered between February 28,
1913, and January 1, 1928, it may be to the taxpayer's advan-
tage to use the fair market value at January 1, 1928, as a
basis rather than discovery value. Considerable doubt is raised
by the statute, however, as to the authority of the taxpayer
to use the January 1, 1928, value as a basis in such instances.
Literally construed, the statute limits the taxpayer to the dis-
covery value basis or cost and makes no distinction between
mines discovered before or after January 1, 1928. The framers
of the statute probably intended to give an option in the case
of mines discovered prior to January 1, 1928, and the court
may hold that the language of the statute quoted above (see
(1) above) which immediately precede the discovery value
provision in the statute, suffciently demonstrates that intent.
131. Another adjustment will probably be necessary in certain in-
stances because of the fact that in the Federal Act deprecia-
tion is apparently allowed only for property "used in the
trade or business" (Federal Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 23(k)) whereas no such limitation appears in the state act which
apparently grants an allowance for depreciation on any de-
preciable corporate property. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8(f), as amended, Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, sec. 1.
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570. Oil and Gas Wells.
In the case of oil and gas wells the act now pro-
vides that "the allowance for depletion shall be twenty-
seven and one-half per centum of the gross income
from the property during the taxable year. Such allow-
ance shall not exceed fifty per centum of the net income
of the taxpayer (computed without allowance for deple-
tion from the property), except that in no case shall
the depletion allowance be less than it would be if
computed in the manner provided in Sections 113 and
114 of the said revenue act of 1928."132 (Italics added.)
Under the provisions of the 1929 act' the allowance
for depletion was not to be less than it would have been
if computed upon the basis of Sections 113 and 114
of the Federal Revenue Act of 1928 or at the election
of the taxpayer upon the basis provided in Section 19
of the state act which used January 1, 1928, as a basic
date. The Legislature in 1931 amended the statute as
indicated in the italicized portion of the above quotation
and thus no longer permits additional deductions for
depletion based upon January 1, 1928, valuations, but
provides that in no case shall the depletion be less than
it would be if computed upon the cost or March 1, 1913,
values of the property. In its report to the Governor
and Legislature the Joint Legislative Committee on
taxation declared that "The use of the 1928 basic date
has worked to the distinct advantage of oil corporations.
Many of these concerns paid the minimum tax of $25
because of the liberal depletion allowance they were
able to take by using the January 1, 1928, value of
their properties." The amendment the committee "be-
132. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (g), amended Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
64, sec. 1.
133. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 8 (g).
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lieve will result in increased taxes from these organiza-
tions to the extent of $300,000".1134
The act clearly discriminates against oil and gas
companies, since they are the only corporations deprived
of the opportunity of basing depletion deductions on
January 1, 1928, values. It may be contended that
this discrimination amounts to a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws. In view, however, of the extensive
power of the state to classify various callings, trades
and businesses for purposes of taxation, it is very
unlikely that such contention will be upheld.135
A more serious objection, perhaps, may be raised by
oil and gas companies whose tax accrued prior to Feb-
ruary 27, 1931, the effective date of the amendment.
Section 4 of the act provides that taxes accrue under
the act on the first day after the close of the taxable
year. Corporations whose tax accrued prior to Feb-
ruary 27, 1931, computed their tax under the provisions
of the statute which allowed a deduction for depletion
based on January 1, 1928, values. The tax on such
134. Senate Daily Journal, January 23, 1931, p. 90.
135. See State Board of Tax Comm. v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527,
51 Sup. Ct. 540; Alward v. Johnson (1931), 282 U. S. 509, 51
Sup. Ct. 273; Bekins Van Lines v. Riley (1929), 280 U. S. 80.
59 Sup. Ct. 64, and authorities cited in the opinions of each of
these cases. The rule was summarized as follows in Connolly
v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. (1902) 184 U. S. 540, 562, 22 Sup. Ct.
431, 440: "A tax may be imposed only upon certain callings
and trades, for when the state exerts its power to tax, it is not
bound to tax all pursuits or all property that may be legitimately
taxed for governmental purposes. It would be an intolerable
burden if a State could not tax any property or calling, unless,
at the same time, it taxed all property or all callings. Its dis-
cretion in such matters is very great. * * *."
See also Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. (1918) 240 U. S. 103,
36 Sup. Ct. 278, which involved a somewhat similar problem
under the Federal Revenue Act of 1913 and in which the tax-
payer unsuccessfully contended that the depletion provisions of
that act which discriminated against mining corporations in
favor of other corporations and individuals rendered the tax
unconstitutional.
FRANCHISE TAx ACT
corporations, it may be argued, became a determined
and accrued liability before the amendment became
effective and the statute cannot be applied retroactively
to change it.' 36  It is submitted, however, that the
retroactivity is more apparent than real. The tax is
not a tax on the income earned by such corporations
during the taxable year prior to February 27, 1931,
but is a tax on the privilege of doing business during
the succeeding taxable year. In other words, the privi-
lege taxed is a present and continuing privilege, the
amount of the tax being measured by the transactions
in a prior period.' The tax imposed in 1931 is not
a retroactive tax but a tax for the current taxable year.
It is difficult to see on what basis a taxpayer can claim
that, regardless of legislative action, current taxes must
be figured on the same basis on which past taxes have
been assessed, or in fact on what grounds he can com-
plain if the rates of current taxes were increased or
if, indeed, additional taxes were imposed during the
same year on the same subject.'
571. Taxable Year.
Corporations taxable under the act are taxed upon
the basis of a "taxable year". The taxable year is
determined by the annual accounting period, fiscal year
or calendar year, as the case may be, in accordance with
136. !See Riley v. Havens (1924) 193 Cal. 432, 225 Pac. 275; Riley v.
Howard (19245 193 Cal. 522, 226 Pac. 393; Estate of Potter
(1922) 188 Cal. 55, 204 Pac. 826. See, however, (1929) 17 Calif.
L. Rev. 520, note 156.
137. See Continental Oil Co. v. Walker (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ) 285
Fed. 729; People ex rel Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Kelsey (1906) 116 App. Div. 97, 101 N. Y. Supp. 902, aff'd
188 N. Y. 541, 80 N. E. 1116; American Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Adams (1900) 28 Colo. 119, 63 Pac. 410. See also Milliken
v. t. S. (1931) 283 U. S. 15.
138. See Patton v. Brady (1902) 184 U. S. 608, 22 Sup. Ct. 493.
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the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping
the books of the corporation."' The taxable year may
thus be a "calendar year"; or it may be a "fiscal year"
if the corporation closes its twelve-months accounting
period upon a date other than December 31; or it may
be a fraction of either if the return is made for a frac-
tional period. If the corporation makes no selection
for its taxable year it is taxed upon a calendar year
basis. The tax, which is computed upon the basis of
the corporation's net income for the next preceding
fiscal or calendar year, accrues on the first day after
the close of the taxable year.
572. Returns.
Within two months and fifteen days after the close of
the taxable year, the corporation must make a return14 0
to the franchise tax commissioner which must be veri-
fied by an executive officer of such corporation. A
reasonable extension of time for filing returns, not to
exceed ninety days, may be granted by the commissioner
when in his judgment good cause exists therefor.14
139. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, secs. 11, 12. The act fails to provide for
cases in which a corporation desires to change its accounting
period. The federal act permits such change with the approval
of the Commissioner and provides that a separate return must
be filled for the intermediate period. Fed. Rev. Act of 1928
Secs. 46, 47. The franchise tax commissioner may have au-
thority to permit a change and to require a return for the in-
termediate period but there should be a definite statutory basis
for that authority and the present uncertainty removed by
legislative action.
140. Ibid. Sec. 12.
141. Ibid, Sec. 15. By virtue of Sec. 23 of the statute an extension of
time for filing the return automatically exfends the time for pay-
ing the first installment of the tax: "Where an extension of
time for filing returns has been granted by the commissioner
under the provisions of Section 15 of this Act, the first install-
ment shall be paid prior to the expiration of such extension. If
one-half of the tax is not paid on or before its due date, or the
due date as extended by the commissioner, it shall be delinquent
and a penalty of fifteen per centum added thereto." It should
be observed that the extension is only effective for the first
FRANCHISE TAX ACT 741
If required returns are not made the commissioner
is authorized to make an estimate of the net income
and to compute and levy the amount of tax from any
information in his possession.142 If the corporation
fails or refuses to furnish a return or other data
required by the commissioner or renders a false or
fraudulent return it is guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to a maximum fine of $5,000 for each offense.
The officer making, signing, or verifying a false or
fraudulent return with intent to evade or defeat the
assessment required by law is guilty of a misdemeanor
and for each offense shall be fined not less than $300
nor more than $5,000 or imprisoned. for one year in
the county jail, or in the discretion of the court may
be both fined and imprisoned. "In the event that fraud
or evasion on the part of a taxpayer is discovered by
the commissioner, he shall have the power and it shall
be his duty to determine the extent to which the state
has been defrauded and to compute and charge against
installment and has nothing whatever to do with the second in-
stallment. Time for paying the balance is totally unaffected by
grant of an extension. Section 23 provides that "at the time
of the delinquency of the second installment an additional penalty
of 5 per centum shall be added to the first installment unless
that installment has theretofore been paid." Thus, though the
time for paying the first installment be extended, 5o will be
added to it if the second installment becomes due before the ex-
tended time for paying the first. See Opinion of Attorney Gen-
eral to Franchise Tax Commissioner (July 15, 1930) Prentice
Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1, par. 11,040 in which
it is stated that "If it had been the legislative intention that
an extension of time for filing returns extended the time for
payment of the second installment as well as the first install-
ment it seems to me that the Legislature would have so pro-
vided in definite terms. In any event it appears that there is no
extension of time for the payment of either installment unless it
is 'extended by the commissioner.' In other words, it appears
that although an extension of time for filing a return may,
perhaps, be said automatically to extend the time for paying
the first installment, due to language found in the second para-
graph of Section 23, this does not apply to the second install-
ment."
142. Ibid. Sec. 16.
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a taxpayer a tax in that amount which shall be immedi-
ately due and payable."
573. Payment and Collection of the Tax; Penalties.
One-half of the tax disclosed by the return is "due
and payable on or before the fifteenth day of the third
month following the close of the taxable year". The
balance is "due and payable on or before the fifteenth
day of the ninth month following the close of the tax-
able year". The act provides that if the first install-
ment becomes delinquent a penalty of 15% shall be
added thereto. If the second installment becomes delin-
quent a penalty of 5% shall be added to such install-
ment. An additional penalty of 5% shall be added to
the first installment if it is still delinquent at the time
of the delinquency of the second installment.43
If the amount of the tax or any installment thereof,
or any part of such amount or installment, is not paid
on or before the date prescribed for its payment, there
is added as a part of the tax interest upon such
unpaid amount at the rate of one percentum a month
from the date prescribed for its payment until it is
paid." If the time for the payment of the tax or any
installment has been extended, it is provided that inter-
est at the rate of 6% per annum shall be collected as
part of such tax, from the date when such payment
should have been made if no extension had been granted,
until the date the tax is paid.'" If this total amount
is not paid in full prior to the expiration of the period
143 Ibid. Sec. 23.
144. Ibid. Sec. 24, as amended Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, Sec. 4.
145. Ibid. Under the 1929 provisions interest at the rate of six per-
centum was imposed "from the date when such payment should
have been made if no extension had been granted, until the ex-
piration of the period of the extension." Apparently, under this
provision even if the tax was paid prior to the expiration of the
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of the extension, then, in lieu of interest at the rate
of 6% per annum, interest is added at the rate of 11%
per month on such unpaid amount from the date of
the expiration of the period of the extension until it
is paid.' (If the commissioner determines upon exam-
ination of the return that there is a deficiency in the
amount of the tax14 7 interest upon the amount deter-
mined as a deficiency is assessed at the same time as
the deficiency and must be paid upon notice and demand
from the commissioner and is collected as a part of
the tax, at the rate of six percentum per annum from
the date prescribed for the payment of the tax, or if
the tax is paid in installments, from the date prescribed
for the payment of the first installment, to the date the
deficiency is assessed.) 1"
At any time within one year after the delinquency
of any tax, or installment thereof, the controller of the
state may bring an action in a court of competent juris-
diction in the county of Sacramento in the name of
the people of the state to collect the amount delinquent,
together with penalties.'
period of extension and the state had received its money interest
was nevertheless collected for the full period of the extension.
See Opinion of Attorney General to Franchise Tax Com-
missioner, Prentice Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1,
par. 11054.
146. Ibid.
147. See infra p. 772.
148. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, secs. 7, 14, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931,
c. 15, sec. 4.
149. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 31. "The attorney general must prose-
cute such action, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, relating to service of summons, pleadings, proofs, trials,
and appeals are applicable to the proceedings herein provided for.
In such action a writ of attachment may be issued, and no bond
or affidavit previous to the issuing of said attachment is re-
quired. In such action a certificate by the commissioner or by
the controller showing the delinquency shall be prima facie
evidence of the levy of the tax, of the delinquency and of com-
pliance by the commissioner and the state board of equalization
with all the provisions of this act in relation to the computation
and levy of the tax." Ibid.
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574. Suspension or Forfeiture of Corporate Rights.
In the event of eleven months' delinquency after the
date of the first installment, the corporate powers are
suspended in the case of domestic corporations, except
for the purpose of amending the articles of incorpora-
tion to set forth a new name, and foreign corporations
forfeit the right to do business within the state.'
"Any person who attempts or purports to exer-
cise any of the rights, privileges or powers of any
such domestic corporation, or who transacts or
attempts to transact any intrastate business in this
state in behalf of any such foreign corporation,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon convic-
tion thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less
than two hundred fifty dollars and not exceeding
one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the
county jail not less than fifty days or more than
five hundred days, or both such fine and imprison-
ment. The jurisdiction of such offense shall be
held to be in any county in which any part of
such attempted exercise of such powers, or any
part of such transaction or business occurred.
Every contract made in violation of this section
is hereby declared to be voidable."' 5 '
These penalties are similar to those of Section 3669 (c)
of the California Political Code, a general statutory
provision on tax delinquencies of corporations, except
that under that section contracts made in violation
thereof are void.
150. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 32, amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65,
sec. 8, and amended further by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066, sec. 6.
See Silvey v. Fink (1929) 99 Cal. App. 528, 278 Pac. 202; So.
Land Co. v. McKenna (Cal. App. 1929), Prentice Hall, State and
Local Tax Service, Vol. 1, pars. 11033, 11043, 11075.
151. Ibid.
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575. Reinstatement of Suspended Corporations.
Section 33 of the act, which covers the reinstatement
of suspended corporations, now provides that,
"Any corporation which has suffered the sus-
pension or forfeiture provided for in the preceding
section may be relieved therefrom upon payment
of the tax and the interest and penalties for non-
payment of which the suspension or forfeiture
occurred, if the payment is made during the year
in which the suspension or forfeiture occurred, or
upon payment of such amount together with an
amount equal to twice the amount of the tax and
penalties due the state for the year in which the
suspension or forfeiture occurred, if payment is
made in any year other than such year, or upon
the issuance by the controller of a certificate of
revivor. Application for such certificate on behalf
of any domestic corporation which has suffered
such suspension may be made by any stockholder
or creditor or by a majority of the surviving trus-
tees or directors thereof; application for such cer-
tificate may be made by any foreign corporation
which has suffered such forfeiture or by any stock-
holder or creditor thereof. Before such certificate
of revivor is issued by the controller he shall obtain
from the secretary of state an endorsement upon
such application of the fact that the name of such
corporation is not one which is likely to mislead
the public or which is the same as, or resembles
so closely as to tend to deceive, the name of a
foreign or domestic corporation which is authorized
to transact business in this state or a name which
is under reservation. If the name of such corpo-
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ration is one which is likely to mislead the public
or is the same as, or resembles so closely as to tend
to deceive, the name of a foreign or domestic cor-
poration which is authorized to transact business
in this state, or a name which is under reservation,
the secretary of state shall not endorse such state-
ment upon such application until the corporation
therein named, if it be a domestic corporation, files
in his office amended articles of incorporation
changing its name, or if it be a foreign corpora-
tion, files in his office a copy of such document
changing its name as may be required by the law
of the state or other jurisdiction under which it
was incorporated, which copy shall be certified in
the manner prescribed by section 405 of the Civil
Code. Upon the issuance of such certificates by
the controller the corporation therein named shall
become reinstated, but such reinstatement shall be
without prejudice to any action, defense or right
which has accrued by reason of the original sus-
pension or forfeiture. The certificate of revivor
shall be prima facie evidence of such reinstatement
and such certificate may be recorded in the office of
the county recorder of any county of this state.""
576. Minimum Tax.
All corporations taxable under the act, with the excep-
tion of banks are subject to a minimum tax not subject
to offset of $25."
152. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 33, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
1066, sec. 7.
153. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 4. The reason national banks are not
subject to a minimum tax is that Section 5219 permits a tax on
such banks "according to or measured by their net income." A
minimum tax when there is no net income would not be a tax
measured by net income.
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577. Corporations Whose First Taxable Year Is a Period Less
Than Twelve Months.
A corporation commencing to do business in the state
after the effective date of the statute, March 1, 1929,
must pay in advance the minimum tax, and upon filing
of its tax return two months and fifteen days after the
close of its taxable year its tax for that year is adjusted
upon the basis of the net income received during that
taxable year, a credit being allowed for the prepayment
of the minimum tax.'54  The treatment of a corporation
that commences to do business after the effective date
of the statute and chooses as its first taxable year a
period less than twelve months (which will often be the
case as most corporations keep their books either on a
calendar year basis or on the basis of a fiscal year
ending June 30 and few corporations commence business
on either January 1 or July 1) is different under the
1931 amendment from under the provisions of the 1929
act. Under the 1929 provisions of the act, the tax for
the succeeding taxable year was based upon the same
net income on which the tax for the first taxable year
was based, or in other words the tax for the entire
154. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 781,
sec. 1; Cal. Stats, 1931, c. 65, sec. 3. A rather absurd distinction
results from the failure of the statute adequately to cover the
situation between corporations beginning business in California
in 1929 prior to March 1, 1929, and corporations beginning busi-
ness in that year after March 1, 1929, as pointed out by the State
Board of Equalization in its opinion in Matter of Appeal of
Jones-Moore Paint House Inc. (February 24, 1931), Prentice
Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1, par. 11073: "A cor-
poration commencing to do business in January, 1929, was not
required to pay a minimum tax during that year because it be-
gan business prior to the effective date of the Act, viz: March 1,
1929. If its accounting period was on a calendar year basis, its
first return was due March 15, 1930. On the basis of this return
it would pay taxes for the privilege of doing business both in
1929 and 1930, although it had actually done business for a
shorter period in 1929 than the other corporation, which paid no
tax at all for that year." For similar omissions in the statute,
particularly with regard to problems peculiar to the operation
of the Act in 1929, see (1929) 17 Calif. Law Rev. 456, 516 et seq.
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succeeding year of such a corporation was figured
upon the income of only part of a year."' Under the
statute as amended in 1931, the tax for the fractional
year is computed in the same manner as formerly, but
"the net income to be used as the measure of the tax
for the second taxable year shall be in the same pro-
portion to the net income for the first taxable year as
the number of months in the second taxable year bears
to the number of months covered by the return for the
first taxable year", but in no case may the term "doing
business" as defined in the act be so construed as to
enable a corporation to pay a less amount than the
minimum tax of $25, nor shall a period during which
the corporate powers have not been exercised be con-
sidered as a base for the computation of the tax.158
In other words, the tax for the succeeding year in the
case of such a corporation will be based partly upon
fictitious income, i. e., upon an estimate of what the
income for the whole year would have been computed
upon the assumption that the income for each of the
remaining corresponding fractions of the year would
155. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 13, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1929,
c. 781, sec. 1. For example, a corporation commenced business
July 1, 1929, and elected to report on a calendar year basis, its
taxable year ending December 31, 1929. On January 1, 1930, the
tax for the calendar year 1930 accrued. Suppose the tax
amounted to $500 on the basis of its net income from July 1,
1929, to December 31, 1929. A $25 tax was paid at the time
of commencing business; $475 was due for the 1929 tax. The
return on which the $475 was determined was to be filed by
March 15, 1930 (two months and fifteen days after the close of
the taxable year), and the 1929 tax was adjusted on the basis
of that return. On or before April 15, 1930, one-half of $500 or
$250 was due and payable on the 1930 tax. The tax for the en-
tire year 1930 was apparently to be figured on the corporation's
income for six months only. No subsequent adjustment was
provided for as the tax for 1931 was to be calculated merely on
the net income for the year 1930. This result would not have
followed if the corporation had chosen a taxable year ending
June 30, 1930, since its first taxable year would be an entire rather
than a fractional year.
156. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, sec. 3.
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have been the same as the income for the fraction of
the year in which the corporation actually did business.
For example, suppose that during the first taxable year
the corporation did business from October 1 to Decem-
ber 31, or one quarter of a year, and that its net income
for this period was $500. The estimated income for
four quarters, or the whole year, is four times $500
or $2000, which is the base upon which the tax for the
second taxable year is computed. It is obvious that
this method may work unfairly upon those corporations
whose income is largely seasonal. Suppose that in the
example given the last quarter is ordinarily the only
portion of the year in which income is earned. An
arbitrary assumption that the corporation would have
earned as much income in each of the other three quar-
ters seems clearly unjustified. The constitutional pro-
vision in pursuance of which the act was passed author-
izes a tax according to "net income". It is doubtful
whether fictitious income is "net income" within the
meaning of the constitutional provision. If it is not,
the problem that then arises is similar to that discussed
above regarding the statute's new definition of doing
business, i. e., it will be necessary to determine whether
levying a tax measured by such income is providing by
law for another method of taxing franchises of the
corporations taxable, "authorized in this constitution"
according to paragraph 2 (b) of the constitutional
section, or is within the legislative authority independ-
ently of that section. Furthermore, to tax some corpo-
rations according to actual net income and others by
fictitious net income, it might be contended, raises a
very serious question as to denial of equal protection
of the laws. However, since this results from the elec-
tion by the corporation of its first taxable year a period
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less than twelve months, the contention does not have
much force.
It is suggested that a more satisfactory solution
would have been to have provided that upon the filing
of its tax return two months and fifteen days after the
close of its first taxable year the corporation's tax for
that year should be adjusted upon the basis of the net
income received during that taxable year, allowing a
credit for the prepayment of the minimum tax. The
corporation should further pay as a prepayment for
the tax for its second taxable year an amount equal to
the tax for its first taxable year, the same to be due
and payable at the same times and in the same "manner
as if that amount were the entire amount of its tax
for that year, and upon the filing of its tax return two
months and fifteen days after the close of its second
taxable year the corporation should pay a tax based on
its net income received during that year plus an adjust-
ment for interest and after allowing an adjustment for
the prepayment. But in no event should the tax for
the second taxable year be less than the amount of the
prepayment. This proviso would cover the situation
where the income of the corporation during the second
taxable year would be less than its income for its first
taxable year, and would seem unobjectionable, for that
would have been the result if its first taxable year had
covered a full year rather than only a fractional year,
and the taxpayer would receive the full advantage of
the diminution in income during the second taxable
year, for it would be the basis of the tax for the third
taxable year. 57
157. Another solution, which is believed to be more satisfactory than
that adopted would have been to have provided that a corpora-
tion commencing to do business in the state after the effective
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578. Termination of Corporate Existence During Year.
Any bank or corporation which is dissolved and any
foreign corporation which withdraws from the state
must pay a tax for the months of its fiscal year which
precedes such dissolution or withdrawal measured by
such proportionate part of the net income of the pre-
ceding taxable year as the number of months of the
year prior to such dissolution or withdrawal bears to
the entire taxable year, and in any event must pay a
minimum tax of twenty-five dollars for such period.'
For example, a calendar year corporation dissolves or
withdraws June 30, 1931, having a net income for the
calendar year 1930 of $10,000. It did business in 1931
for half a year and its tax base for that half-year is
half of what it would have been had it continued in
business the full year, i. e., one half of $10,000 or
$5,000.
The act provides that if any bank or corporation
discontinues actual operations within the state in any
date of the statute must pay in advance the minimum tax upon
filing of its tax return two months and fifteen days after the
close of its taxable year that its tax for that year should be ad-
justed upon the basis of the net income received during that
taxable year, a credit being allowed for the prepayment of the
minimum tax; and to have provided that the minimum tax should
be paid in advance for the second taxable year, and that upon
the filing of its tax return two months and fifteen days after
the close of its second taxable year, the corporation's tax for
that year should be adjusted upon the basis of the net income
received during that taxable year, allowing a credit for the pre-
payment of the minimum tax and plus an adjustment for in-
terest. No difficulties, apparently, are then presented for suc-
ceeding taxable years, the tax in each instance being based on
the income of the preceding taxable year, e. g., the tax for the
third taxable year wquld be based upon the net income of the
second taxable year, and the tax for the fourth taxable year
would be based upon the net income of the third taxable year,
etc. The objection that under this method the state has to wait
longer for any tax for the second taxable year seems to be
outweighed by the probable legal difficulties and unfairness of
the present method.
158. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, secs. 3, 4.
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year and thereafter has no net income but does not
dissolve or withdraw from the state, it shall in the suc-
ceeding year and thereafter until dissolution, withdrawal
or resumption of operations, pay an annual tax to the
state of twenty-five dollars.'" As applied to foreign
corporations this provision is of doubtful constitution-
ality for the reasons given above in the discussion
of the definition of "doing business". As applied to
national banks it is probably unconstitutional as not in
pursuance of the provisions of Section 5219 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States that such banks
may be taxed "according to or measured by their net
income". A minimum tax, when there is no net income,
would obviously not be measured by net income.
579. Consolidated Returns.
Under the statute as enacted in 1929 a consolidated
return in lieu of separate returns could be made in the
case of an affiliated group of banks or corporations or
one or more banks and one or more corporations. 60 In
1931 the statute was amended to withdraw the right
of a bank to file a consolidated return with a non-
banking corporate member of the affiliation.161
An affiliated group is defined by the statute as two
or more banks or two or more corporations connected
through stock ownership in the case of a bank, with a
common parent bank or, in the case of a corporation,
with a common parent corporation (1) if at least ninety-
five per centum of the stock of each of the banks or
corporations except the common parent bank or corpo-
ration, is owned directly by one or more of the other
159. Ibid.
160. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 14.
161. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, sec. 2.
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banks or corporations, and the common parent bank or
corporation owns directly at least ninety-five per centum
of the stock of at least one of the other banks or cor-
porations; or (2) if at least ninety-five per centum of
the stock of each of the banks in the banking group,
or of each of the corporations in the corporate group,
is owned "by the same interests or by the same stock-
holders". Non-voting stock which is limited and pre-
ferred as to dividends is not included in the meaning of
the term "stock" in either of the above classifications. 162
The act further provides that in the case of a bank
or corporation which is the member of the affiliated
group for a fractional part of the year the consolidated
return shall include the income of such bank or corpora-
tion for such part of the year as it is a member of the
affiliated group. Although the act does not expressly
so provide, inasmuch as separate returns are required
of all corporations except members of the affiliated
group, a separate return must be filed for that portion
of the year before the corporation became a member of
the affiliated group or for that portion of the year for
which, because of changes in stock ownership, it failed
to meet the requirements of membership in the group.
The first classification above is the same as that con-
tained in the federal act." The former federal revenue
acts contained a provision corresponding to the second
classification, but so many difficult and complicated
problems arose thereunder that, beginning with the
taxable year 1929, it was abolished. Corporations are
thus allowed to make consolidated returns in California
in cases that would not be allowed under the federal
act.
162. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, sec. 2.
163. Fed. Rev. Act 1928, sec. 141.
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It is obvious that two or more corporations, although
distinct legal entities, may be operated as a business
unit. The apparent purpose of permitting consolidated
returns is to tax as a business unit what in reality is a
business unit. The California statute, however, is seri-
ously defective in not clearly providing for the computa-
tion of the tax in the case consolidated returns are filed.
Sections 1, 2, and 4 of the act specifically provide that
"every" bank and "every" taxable corporation shall pay
a tax according to or measured by "its" net income.
Section 13, discussed above in paragraph 577, sets forth
the method of computing the tax on corporations com-
mencing to do business in the state after the effective
date of the act and choosing as a taxable year a period
less than twelve months, and, as noted above, Section 14
provides that in the case of a bank or corporation which
is a member of the affiliated group for a fractional part
of the year the consolidated return shall include the
income of such bank or corporation for such part of the
year as it is a member of the affiliated group. If a
corporation commences business as a member of the
affiliated group and also commences business during a
fractional part of the taxable year of the group, will
its tax be computed according to Section 13 or will that
section be superseded and the new corporation's income
and losses be merged in the income and losses of the old
members of the group and the new corporation be con-
sidered as having been a member of the affiliated group
during the entire taxable year of the group? In other
words, will its tax for its first taxable year be incorpo-
rated in the tax on the group as a unit and will losses
incurred by some of the corporations before the new
corporation joined the group- offset the income of the
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new member? Section 14 simply permits the filing of
consolidated returns but omits to provide for computing
the tax when such returns are filed. Such failure, it
may be argued, leaves Sections 1, 2, 4, and 13 in full
force and effect so that, although consolidated returns
are filed, the tax is nevertheless to be computed upon
the net income of each corporation in compliance with
those sections. In other words, by failing to provide
that the tax shall be computed upon the consolidated
net income of the group as if it were a single corpora-
tion the provision for consolidated returns is rendered
meaningless and the property tax offsets and losses of
one corporation may not offset the net income or reduce
the tax on other corporations. It may be contended
that the words "consolidated returns" as used in Section
14 necessarily involve consolidating the net income and
taxing such income as a unit as if the affiliated group
were a single corporation. Some support for this con-
tention may be found in Section 26 of the act, which
states that, "Where a consolidated return has been made
under section 14 hereof the offset allowable against the
tax liability of the consolidated group may include said
property taxes paid during said period by all corpora-
tions which are included in the consolidated group, sub-
ject to the limitations of section 4 hereof." (Italics
added.) But if this contention is sound, other difficul-
ties must be met. Upon whom is the tax assessed when
consolidated returns are filed? Is it assessed against
the parent corporation or against each corporation in
proportion to the net income properly assignable to
each? Is the tax apportioned among the corporations
as directed by the parent corporation or as they may
agree among themselves or are the members severally
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liable for the tax assessed upon the group? Sections
1, 2, 4 and 13 perhaps afford the most direct answers
to these questions. See, however, Sections 23 and 25.
Even if it be determined that the statute authorizes
the computation of the tax on the consolidated net
income of the group, thereby permitting the losses and
property tax offsets of one corporation to offset the
net income and reduce the tax of other corporations, a
very serious constitutional question must be met. The
constitutional section, in pursuance of which the act
was passed, makes no provision for consolidated returns
but provides that taxable corporations shall be taxed
according to or measured by "their net income". Cor-
porations that are allowed to offset their net income by
the losses of other corporations are obviously not being
taxed according to "their net income". If it be held
that the statute does not impose the tax set forth in the
constitutional section, the problem that will then arise
will be similar to that discussed above in connection
with the new definition of doing business, namely,
whether levying such a tax is providing by law for
another method of taxing franchises "authorized in
this constitution" according to paragraph 2 (b) of Sec-
tion 16 or is within the legislative authority independ-
ently of that section.
If Section 14 permits affiliated groups to be taxed as if
they were a single corporation, an interesting question is
presented by the 1931 amendment to that section with-
drawing the right of banks to file a consolidated return
with non-banking corporate members of the affiliation.
The effect of the amendment is to prevent banks from
writing off against their net income the losses of their
non-banking corporate associates, from eliminating in-
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tercompany profits, and from reducing their taxes by the
offsets of local taxes paid by such associates. Section
5219 of the United States Revised Statutes provides
that the rate of tax on national banks "shall not be
higher than the rate assessed upon other financial cor-
porations nor higher than the highest of the rates
assessed by the taxing state upon mercantile, manufac-
turing and business corporations doing business within
its limits". The word "rate" as used in Section 5219
under the share tax method authorized thereby has
been held to apply not only to the arithmetical measure
or percentage of tax but also to the basis of assessment,
discrimination as to either being a violation of that
section." There is no reason to doubt that the same
interpretation will be given the word "rate" as used in
the income tax methods authorized by Section 5219.
Inasmuch as not only other financial corporations but
in fact all taxable corporations other than banks may
be allowed deductions and offsets not allowed national
banks, there seems to be a clear violation of the con-
ditions of the federal statute. As to domestic banks
it may be contended that the discrimination is a denial
of equal protection of the laws, but it is doubtful if
such contention is sound."6 '
Section 5219 also presents another question if the
consolidated returns provision is interpreted to permit
losses of members of the banking group to offset income
of other members and to permit the real property tax
offsets of members to reduce the tax on other members.
Section 5219 authorizes a tax on national banks accord-
ing to or measured by "their" net income. If some
national banks are permitted to offset their net income
164. (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 83, 107, 236.
165. Ibid, 456, 486.
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by losses of other banks, national or state, or to reduce
their tax by the real property tax offsets of other banks,
a plausible argument can be made that they are not
being taxed according to or measured by "their" net
income and that the provisions of Section 5219 are
being violated. 1 1a
The privilege of making a consolidated return cannot
be used to escape the payment of the minimum tax by
any member of the group. If the consolidated return
shows no net income, or only a small net income, the
minimum tax for the group must at least equal the sum
of the minimum taxes for each of the corporations in
the group for which the consolidated return is made. 66
Section 14 also provides that in the case of two or
more corporations or banks or of one or more banks
and one or more corporations owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the commis-
sioner is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate
gross income or deductions between or among such
corporations or banks, if he determines that such dis-
tribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such corporations or banks. 166a
580. When Does the Tax Become a Lien?'867
It was apparently intended by the constitutional sec-
tion that the new tax should accrue upon a fixed date
which, if in accord with the general tax system set up
16$a. See a similar argument that the offset provisions invalidate the
statute in (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 456, 500-507.
166. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, secs. 3, 4.
166a. See infra, n. 176.
167. The discussion which follows about the lien provisions of the
statute is taken from an article by the writer in (1929) 17 Calif.
L. Rev. 456, 522 et seq.
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in the constitutional article of which it is a part, would
be the first Monday in March of that year. Appar-
ently with this in mind the framers of the constitu-
tional section provided that "Said taxes shall become a
lien upon the first Monday of March of 1929 and of
each year thereafter", thus establishing a lien date in
accord with the lien date of the other taxes provided
for by Article XIII. One of the outstanding charac-
teristics of the tax system set up by Article XIII is
the fact that the accrual of a tax and the attachment
of its lien are coincident. Thus, under that article, the
fixing of the tax obligation on the subject of the tax
and the creation of the tax lien must be regarded
as occurring simultaneously, although, of course, the
amount of the tax may not be ascertained until later,
in which case there is a relation back to the date when
the tax first accrued and became a lien.168 The attach-
ment of the lien at the date of the accrual of the tax
is an essential feature of a sound tax system, for no
practical object could be served by having a lien attach
before any tax had accrued, or by having the lien
attach at a date after the tax had.accrued.
Notwithstanding these basic propositions, the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act provides for an
accrual date which shall be "the first day after the close
of the taxable year" and defines "taxable year" as the
"calendar year or the fiscal year . . . upon the basis
of which the net income is computed".' 69 As a result,
instead of providing for one accrual day, the act estab-
lishes January 1 as the accrual date for calendar year
corporations and the first day of any of the other eleven
months as the date for fiscal year corporations. By
168. Estate of Backesto (1923), 63 Cal. App. 265, 218 Pac. 597.
169. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 11.
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reason of the constitutional provision, the act could not
provide that the lien should attach at the varying date
of accrual, and instead was forced to provide for a
single fixed lien date. The provision is found in Sec-
tion 29 of the act:
"The taxes levied under this act shall constitute
a lien upon all property of the taxpayer, which
lien shall attach on the first Monday in March of
each year. Every tax herein provided for has the
effect of a judgment against the taxpayer and
every lien has the effect of a judgment duly levied
against all property of the delinquent. . .
The language of this section is ambiguous. If the tax
is to be a lien on the first Monday in March the pro-
vision that every tax has the effect of a judgment is
superfluous if it means no more than that every tax is
to have the effect of a lien. The provision that every
tax is to have the effect of a judgment might be read
as providing that every tax should have the effect of a
lien upon accrual; however, this interpretation is pre-
cluded by reason of the constitutional stipulation that
the lien attach on the first Monday in March.
Section 29 apparently, therefore, provides that the
lien shall only attach on the first Monday in March.
Since under the act taxes accrue before and after the
lien date, it is pertinent to ask, on what March does the
lien attach if the tax accrues after the first Monday
in March? Does the lien relate back to the preceding
March, or must the attachment of the lien be delayed
until the March following? The provision must operate
in one way or the other and the act leaves this impor-
tant question in doubt.
In so far as the language of the act is concerned,
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the view that the lien relates back to the preceding
March is as tenable as the view that the lien attaches
the March following. From the standpoint of their
effect one is as undesirable as the other. If the lien
is considered as attaching on the March following the
accrual a bad situation results, for it means that after
a corporation becomes liable for taxes a period inter-
venes before the lien will attach. The corporation may
sell its property within that period free from any lien
for the taxes due against it. For example, suppose a
fiscal year corporation ended its taxable year on June
30, 1931; on the next day its tax for the next fiscal
year accrued; however, the lien for that tax will not
attach until the following March, i. e., March, 1932.
Thus the corporation has a period within which it may
sell its property free of a lien for the accrued taxes.
Such procedure is fundamentally contrary to sound tax
policy.
The other possibility is to have the lien relate back
to the prior March; for example, if a corporation's
taxable year ended June 30, 1931, its tax accrued on
July 1, 1931, and the lien for the tax attached on March
4, 1931, four months before the tax accrued. Thus,
if the lien always related back to the preceding March
the objection that the tax might be avoided could not
be raised. However, the effect of such procedure upon
the securing of a clear marketable title from a corpo-
ration selling its property would be extremely important,
for a purchaser might find his property subject to a
lien for taxes subsequently accruing against the cor-
poration, of which he could have no knowledge without
examining the accounting system of the corporation in
question. A purchaser in April might subsequently
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find that a lien had attached the month before for taxes
accruing against the corporation, perhaps as late as
January following his purchase.
From the foregoing it is evident that the lien pro-
visions of the act create a situation of doubt, with a
choice between undesirable alternatives.
581. Allocation of Income.
If the corporation's entire business is done in Cali-
fornia the tax is measured by its entire net income,
but if not, the tax is measured by that portion of its
income which is derived from business done within this
state.7 o If the corporation's business extends beyond
the limits of this state a difficult problem arises in deter-
mining the amount of its net income that can fairly be
said to be taxable in this state. An analysis of the
statute and of the relevant decisions sufficiently full to
cover this difficult problem adequately would require a
lengthy article in itself. It is proposed here simply to
outline some of the problems and express an opinion.
At one time it could be declared with some assurance
that if the subject taxed was a corporate franchise, no
difficult legal problem regarding allocation was involved
in view of the well-established rule that a franchise tax
could be measured by elements which themselves were
not taxable.' But under the existing law, as indicated
above,172 the state cannot, without running the risk of
invalidating its tax, include within the tax base elements
of value not taxable per se. Where the business is
spread out over different states the problem arises
170. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 10, amended by Cal. Stats. 1931 c. 1066.
171. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 305, 12
Sup. Ct. 403. For other cases and a discussion of the measure-
ment of excise taxes, see (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 232 et seq.
172. Supra p. 712.
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whether the -state is taxing values beyond its jurisdic-
tion. The "unit rule" of assessment in property taxa-
tion'is designed to allocate to. the state for taxation
its fair share of the taxable values of the taxpayer.
Somewhat the same theory is employed in the case of
business taxes. In other words, the business is treated
as a "unit" when that portion of the taxpayer's busi-
ness done within the state cannot be segregated from
that done outside the state. The courts are aware of
the inherent difficulties in this kind of situation, and
although the law is not definitely settled, the general
rule seems to be that, unless the state's method of
apportionment is intrinsically arbitrary or can be shown
by the taxpayer clearly and substantially to reach non-
taxable values, it will be upheld."
173. See State Railroad Tax Cases (1875), 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663;
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania (1891), 141 U. S. 18,
11 Sup. Ct. 876; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor
(1897), 165 U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185, 17 Sup. Ct. 305; Fargo v.
Hart (1904), 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498; Meyer v. Wells
Fargo & Co. (1912), 223 U. S. 298, 32 Sup. Ct. 218, 219; Union
Tank Line Co. v. Wright (1919), 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct.
276; Wallace v. Hines (1920), 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435. See
also, Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926), 35 Yale L. J. 838.
174. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 U. S.
113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton
(1923), 262 U. S. 413, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 620, 621; Bass, Ratcliff
& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission (1924) 266 U. S. 271,
45 Sup. Ct. 82; National Leather Co. v. Massachusetts (1928),
277, U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 534; in all of which the court was of
the opinion that the taxpayer did not sustain the burden of prov-
ing that the method of apportionment reached non-taxable
values. See, however, Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina (1931)
283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, in which the taxpayer success-
fully sustained such burden. It is important to observe that the
tax involved in the Hans Rees case was a direct net income tax
and not a franchise tax measured by net income. It is possible
that the result might have been different had the tax been a
franchise tax "measured by" net income. See supra note 67a
and the text to which it is appended.
See a comment on the Hans Rees' case in (1930) 40 Yale L.
J. 1273, and an extensive annotation in 75 L. Ed. 879. See also,
Powell, Business Taxes and The Federal Constitution (1925)
National Tax Association Proceedings, 164, 177; Gertsenberg,
Report of Committee on Standardization and Simplification of
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A typical situation in which the unit rule seems
clearly applicable arises when the corporation has a
factory located in one state and maintains selling agen-
cies in other states. How much of the income of the
company is due to manufacturing? How much to the
company's sales? The entire business of such a cor-
poration would seem to be so clearly unitary as to
require a fair system of apportionment in order to
prevent overtaxation to the corporation or undertaxa-
tion by the state. 75
A different situation, however, is presented where the
business is not unitary in character (as may be true in
the case of certain personal service corporations), or
is of such a nature that the corporation can present
accounts which clearly show the income derived from
business done within the state as distinguished from
the income derived from extrastate business. The unit
rule seems hardly applicable to such a corporation, and
it is submitted that the income from business done with-
out the state should not enter into the calculations by
which the tax is assessed.'
the Business Taxes (1929), National Tax Association Proceed-
ings, 152; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax
Purposes (1931), 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1075.
175. See, however, Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, supra, note
174, "But the fact that the corporate enterprise is a unitary
one, in the sense that the ultimate gain is derived from the
entire business, does not mean that for the purpose of taxa-
tion the activities which are conducted in different jurisdictions
are to be regarded as 'component parts of a single unit' so that
the entire net income may be taxed in one state regardless of
the extent to which it may be derived from the conduct of the
enterprise in another state." Ibid.
176. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Thoresen (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), 29
F. (2d) 708; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax
Commission (1929), 197 Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85. See also,
Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, supra, note 174.
The device of splitting the business into separate legal entities
by setting up separate manufacturing and sales corporations
which are financially interdependent and allocating by means
of inter-corporate contracts profits to each process of the busi-
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Another situation arises where the business is unitary
but the corporation receives income from sources or
activities that have no connection with business done
within the state. If the corporation is a domestic cor-
poration it is probably constitutional to include such
income in the tax base of a franchise tax measured
by net income." If the corporation is a foreign cor-
poration there can hardly be said to be just grounds
for including such income in the base. 78 However,
this distinction between foreign and domestic corpora-
tions does not arise under the California act in regard
to this particular problem, for in the case of both kinds
of corporations the statute contemplates a tax measured
by only that portion of net income reasonably attrib-
utable to the business done within this state." On the
ness, presents an interesting problem. See Palmolive Co. v.
Conway (W. D. Wis. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 226 in which this de-
vice failed, the court allowing the tax commission to treat the
affiliated group as a taxable unit. See also, Buick Motor Car
Co. v. Conway (Wis. 1931), 48 F. (2d) 801 (certiorari denied,
Oct. 26, 1931, 52 Sup. Ct. 34); People ex rel Studebaker Co. v.
Gilchrist (........) 244 N. Y. 114, 155 N. E. 68, note (1927) 27 Col.
L. Rev. 753; Cliffs Chem. Co. v. Tax Comm'r (1927) 193 Wis.
295 N. W. For critical discussion of this device see Magill,
Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract (1931), 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 935; Breckenridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of
Holding Company (1931), 9 N. C. L. Rev. 189; (1931) 31 Col.
L. Rev. 713. Compare this device, however, with that success-
fully employed by the taxpayer in the Hans Rees' case of split-
ting its income into independent sources according to the prin-
cipal departments of its business.
177. See Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles (1916), 242 U. S. 111,
37 Sup. Ct. 58 and discussion supra p. 707.
178. See the following cases involving allocation in property taxation:
Wallace v. Hines (1920) 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435; Union
Tank Line Co. v. Wright (1919), 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276;
Meyer v. Wells Fargo & Co. (1912), 223 U. S. 298, 32 Sup. Ct.
218; Fargo v. Hart (1904), 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498. See
also, discussion supra p. 712.
As to income earned within the state, the fact that the tax-
payer is a foreign organization makes no difference. See Shafter
v. Carter (1920), 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 22 upholding the
right of the state to levy an income tax upon income received
by a nonresident from property within the state. See also
cases cited supra, n. 167.
179. Cal Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 10.
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other hand, if the corporation receives income from
California sources which have no connection with busi-
ness done without the state, there is apparently no
necessity to allocate such income as all of it is attrib-
utable to California. 80
If the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce
several problems arise, particularly with regard to for-
eign corporations. Several rules on the subject may
be stated somewhat dogmatically as follows: (1) If
the corporation is a foreign corporation and its busi-
ness is exclusively interstate in character, an excise on
its right to do business is invalid'8 ' and obviously no
question of allocation can arise. (2) If a direct net
income rather than a franchise tax measured by net
income is levied, the income attributable to business
done within the state is probably taxable, even though
the corporation's business is exclusively interstate in
character.' 82 (3) If the corporation combines some
intrastate business with its interstate business an excise
tax measured by net income properly attributable to
business done within the state, whether intra or inter-
state in character, seems clearly valid.'83 (4) If the
180. It is apparently on this theory that dividends from stocks were
not subject to allocation under the commissioner's third ruling
supra, note 58.
181. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts (1925), 268 U. S.
203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477.
182. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek (1918), 247 U. S.
321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton(1923), 262 U. S. 413, 43 Sup. Ct. 620.
183. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, supra, note 182;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton, supra note 182; Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920), 254 U. S. 113, 41
Sup. Ct. 45; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Com-
mission (1924), 266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82; Shaffer v. Carter(1920), 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221.
A difficult problem of allocation is presented in the case of
sales in interstate commerce of goods manufactured in one state
and delivered in another. The Supreme Court in United States
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, supra note 182, summarized
the method employed by the state in that case as follows:
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corporation is a domestic corporation, even though
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, income
"In order to determine what part of the income of a cor-
poration engaged in business within and without the state (other
than that derived from rentals, stocks, bonds, securities, etc.)
is to be taxed as derived from business transacted and property
located within the state, reference is had to a formula prescribed
by another statute [Wis. Stat. sec. 1770b, subsec. 7, par. (2)]
for apportioning the capital stock of foreign corporations, under
which the gross business in dollars of the corporation in the
state, added to the value in dollars of its property in the state,
is made the numerator of a fraction of which the denominator
consists of the total gross business in dollars of the corporation
both within and without the state. The resulting fraction is
taken by the income tax law as representing the proportion of
the income which is deemed to be derived from business trans-
acted and property located within the state. This formula was
applied in apportioning plaintiff's net 'business income' for the
year 1911, and upon the portion thus attributed to the state,
plus the income from rentals, stocks, bonds, etc., the tax in
question was levied." The principal difficulty with this formula
is the problem it raises of determining the "gross business in
dollars of the corporation in the state" which is to be included
in the numerator. The purpose of using the formula at all is
to determine what income is derived from business in the state.
If it is known what "business" is attributable to the state why
use the formula? It was contended in this case that the follow-
ing items were beyond the taxing power of the state because
derived from interstate commerce: (1) net income of about
$65,000 from goods sold outside the state and delivered from the
taxpayer's factory in the state; (2) net income of about $31,000
from goods sold to customers outside of the state, the sales
having been made and the goods shipped from plaintiff's
branches in other states, and the goods having, been manufac-
tured at plaintiff's factory and shipped before sale to said
branches. The Supreme Court of the United States passed only
on the question of the taxability of net income from interstate
commerce. The question as to the validity or effect of the
formula with regard to the taxation of income attributable to
another state was apparently not raised. It is not clear from
the opinion of the state court in this case (1915), 161 Wis. 211,
153 N. W. 241, what items were included in the numerator of
the allocation formula. The broad language of the court would
indicate that the gross business in dollars of the business in-
volved in both situations (1) and (2) were included in the
numerator. That language, however, seems to be addressed to
the contention of the taxpayer that none of this income was
taxable because derived from interstate commerce and not to
the problem of what items should be included in either the
numerator or denominator of the allocation formula. The case
of Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson (1922), 258 U. S. 290,
42 Sup. Ct. 305, is also unsatisfactory and perhaps misleading
on this problem. The tax in that case on the privilege of doing
business in Illinois was measured by capital stock allocated to
the state "by averaging the percentage of the total business of
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properly attributable to business done within the state
may be included in the tax calculations, and probably,
the corporation transacted in Illinois with the percentage of the
total tangible property located in this state." The Hump Hair-
pin Company was a manufacturing corporation with all of its
tangible property in Illinois. Its method of doing business was
to send salesmen into Illinois and the various other states to
solicit orders which were accepted only after approval at the
Chicago office, after which they were filled from stocks main-
tained in that city. The Secretary of State concluded that all of
the business was "transacted in Illinois and, all of the tangible
property of the company being in that state he computed the
tax in question on the corporation's total capital stock. Just
as in the Oak Creek case, the court treated the problem as in-
volving the determination whether an unconstitutional tax was
imposed upon interstate commerce: "The contention of the
plaintiff in error in this court is that, notwithstanding the man-
ner in which it was done, the business which the company did
with residents of states other than Illinois was interstate busi-
ness and that the treating of the amount of it as a part of the
business of the company transacted in that state in determining
the percentage of the total business of the corporation trans-
acted therein, renders the act under which the computation was
made unconstitutional and void for the reason that the tax as-
sessed is a burden upon interstate commerce. Plainly this con-
tention cannot be sustained. The statute and the state Supreme
Court both show a candid purpose to differentiate state from
interstate business and to use only the former in determining
the amount of the disputed tax." The sentence which follows
then touches in a very unsatisfactory manner upon the prob-
lem here discussed: "If the Secretary of State or the court, in
computing the tax, erroneously treated as intrastate that which
was really interstate business, such error would be reason in a
proper case for correcting the computation, but would not justify
declaring the act unconstitutional." In Western Cartridge Co.
v. Emmerson (1930), 281 U. S. 511, 50 Sup. Ct. 383, the court
dealt with practically the same problem presented by the Hump
Hairpin case and in practically the same manner. It is to be
regretted that the court did not pass directly upon the pro-
priety of attributing in the allocation formula all interstate sales
to the state of manufacture. It seems highly arbitrary and un-
just to attribute all the income from interstate sales either to
the state of manufacture, to the state where the negotiation of
the sale takes place and the goods are delivered, to both or to
one to the exclusion of the other. (See Hans Rees' Sons v.
North Carolina (1931), 283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385.) The
only advantage to the taxpayer over taxation of the whole of
such income directly by the state without allocation is the re-
mote possibility, where a compound ratio is used, that a large
proportion of the items in the other factors of the formula
might be outside the state for if so, a larger proportion of the
tax base will be attributable to outside sources. (For example,
suppose that in the Oak Creek case, which used a compound
ratio of gross business and property, that the larger part of
the taxpayer's property was outside the state. This fact would
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although the question is by no means free from doubt,
its entire net income may constitutionally be so in-
cluded"" if the statute so required.
Under the California act the proportion of income
to be allocated to business done in California is com-
puted "upon the basis of sales, purchases, expenses of
manufacture, payroll, value and situs of tangible prop-
erty, or by reference to these or other factors, or by
such other method of allocation as is fairly calculated
to assign to the state the portion of net income reason-
ably attributable to the business done within this state
and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxa-
tion".'
A very important part of this provision is the direc-
tion that the method of allocation adopted by the com-
missioner "be fairly calculated to assign to the state
result in attributing a smaller amount of income taxable by
Wisconsin than if this factor had been omitted.) This fact was
apparently considered of some importance by Mr. Justice Butler,
who wrote the opinion of the court in the Western Cartridge
Co. case, supra: "As the amount depends on the relation each
to the others of the various elements employed in the calcula-
tion, the fee or tax does not directly depend upon the amount
of the taxpayer's interstate transactions. The exaction may rise
while the sales to customers outside Illinois decline and may fall
while such sales increase."
The allocation formula prescribed by the Franchise Tax Com-
missioner in California includes "gross sales" among the factors
to be considered. Are the gross interstate sales to be attributed
all to California in the allocation fraction in the case of goods
manufactured here and delivered outside the state? The cases
cited above may be sufficient authority for such treatment al-
though this is doubtful for the reasons given above. It is sub-
mitted, however, that in this kind of situation the formula "if
fairly calculated to assign to the state the portion of net income
reasonably attributable to business done within this state and to
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation" should call for
a division in some manner between the state in which the goods
are manufactured and the state in which delivered (half to one
and half to the other is suggested as probably as fair a method as
any). See, Powell, Business Taxes and The Federal Consti-
tution (1925), 18 Proc. Nat. Tax Ass'n. 164.
184. See supra, notes 65, 177.
185. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 10.
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the portion of net income reasonably attributable to
business done within this state and to avoid subjecting
the taxpayer to double taxation". The formula adopted
by the commissioner is set forth in Schedule C of the
Bank and Corporation- Franchise Tax Return, and is
explained in his instructions relating to allocation as
follows:
"Allocation of Income and Dividends: The
franchise tax is imposed upon that proportion of
the net income which is derived from business car-
ried on within the state. A corporation is regarded
as 'doing business' within or without the state
when it occupies, has or maintains an office, agency
or branch, where its functions are systematically
and regularly carried on.
"A corporation doing business both within and
without the state which keeps accounts of the
income of each branch or agency which in the opin-
ion of the Franchise Tax Commissioner actually
reflect the net income from sources within the
state of each branch, should report as its net income
subject to tax the income derived from branches
or agencies maintained within the state.186 In all
cases, however, a report will be required of the
gross income of the corporation from all sources,
accompanied by a statement showing the manner
in which income from sources within the state was
determined. (Sec. 10.)
"The allocation formula in Schedule 'C' fixes
the percentage of business done in California by
giving equal weight to the amount and location
of three factors: (1) property, (2) payroll, and
186. See supra p. 764 and supra note 176; Hans Rees' Sons v. North
Carolina, supra note 174.
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(3) gross sales. The percentage so fixed is ap-
plied to net income. .The information called for
in Schedule 'C' must be submitted by all taxpayers.
The taxpayer's allocation, whether or not the pre-
scribed method be used, is subject to review and
re-allocation by the commissioner. It is imperative,
in all cases, that Schedule 'C' be filled out. (Sec.
10.) 187
"The final tax as computed must not fall below
the minimum tax of $25 for each corporation."
It seems safe to say that this formula is at least as
fair and equitable as others which have been examined
and approved by the United States Supreme Court and
is flexible enough to be adjusted to particular and
peculiar situations, and varying United States Supreme
Court decisions. In the situations where the general
formula set forth in Schedule C is not found applicable,
it is submitted that if the commissioner carefully fol-
lows the directions of the statute (that the method of
allocation "be fairly calculated to assign to the state
the portion of net income reasonably attributable to the
business done within this state, and to avoid subjecting
187. For a discussion of each element of the allocation formula and a
comparison with allocation formulae of other states, see Prentice
Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1, par. 3500-3529, and
Maclaren and Butler, California Tax Laws of 1929, 142-160.
See, In Matter of Appeal of Pacific Burt Company Limited
(State Board of Equalization, August 4, 1930)3 Prentice Hall,
State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1, par. 11,042, in which it was
held that although section 10 of the act lists "purchases" among
the factors which may be considered in allocating net income to
this state the Commissioner is not required to consider them and
the taxpayer has no right to insist, as a matter of law that such
factor be included in the allocation formula, since the only
positive requirement of the statute is that the formula be "fairly
calculated to assign to the state the portion of net income
reasonably attributable to the business done within the state
and to avoid subjecting the taxpayers to double taxation." The
burden is upon the taxpayer to show that the consideration of a
particular factor is necessary to produce a proper allocation.
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the taxpayer to double taxation") as nearly in accord-
ance with the rules discussed in the preceding para-
graphs as may be reasonably expected, corporations will
have no grounds for complaint because of improper
allocation."'8
582. Offsets.
The tax is subject to certain offsets. The offsets
allowed are ten percentum of the taxes paid on the
corporation's real property and all of the taxes paid
on its personal property, with the proviso that the total
offsets shall not exceed seventy-five percentum of four
percentum of its net income."' As the real and per-
sonal property taxes are allowed as a deduction in com-
puting net income, the statute, in order to prevent a
double deduction, provides that the four percentum rate
shall be applied to such offset and added to and included
in the tax.' The four per cent amount added back
which is definitely attributable to California is not
allocated or prorated in the case of corporations doing
business within and without California.' 9 '
583. Deficiencies.
The commissioner must examine the returns as soon
as practicable after filing and determine the correct
188. The Act in section 8, subdivisions (d), (e), (g) and (1) and in
sections 12, 16 and 17 allows the Commissioner considerable
power in the final determination of "net income" and in sections
10 and 22 the Commissioner is given power to allocate income
in the tax base. For an analysis of the problem whether the
Legislature has thus made an unconstitutional delegation of
power to the franchise tax commissioner and an opinion that
such delegation is valid, see (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 456, 507-512.
189. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 26 as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
65, sec. 6.
190. Ibid.
191. For a discussion of the problem whether the offset provisions in-
validate the statute see (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 456, 500-507.
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amount of the tax. If he finds that the tax disclosed
by the original return is less than the tax disclosed by
his examination he must mail notice of the proposed
additional tax to the taxpayer at its post-office address
as it appears on the return. Such notice must set forth
the details of the proposed additional assessment and
the details of computation of the tax. "Except in the
case of a fraudulent return, every notice of additional
tax proposed to be assessed . . . shall be mailed to
the taxpayer within one year after the return was filed
and no deficiency shall be assessed or collected with
respect to the year for which such return was filed
unless such notice is mailed within such period, pro-
vided however that in the case of returns filed on or
before June 1, 1930, notice of additional tax proposed
to be assessed may be mailed at any time on or before
June 1, 1931."192 In the case of corporations doing
business within and without the state, if the commis-
sioner makes a reallocation of net income on examina-
tion of the return, he must, on the written request of
the taxpayer disclose the basis on which such realloca-
tion is made.'
584. Protest.
The act provides that "within sixty days after the
mailing of said notice the taxpayer may file with the
commissioner a written protest against the levy of the
proposed additional tax, as computed by the commis-
sioner, specifying therein the grounds upon which the
192. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 25, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
65, sec. 5 and as further amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066,
sec. 5.
193. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 10, amended by Cal. Stats, 1931, c.
1066, sec. 4.
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protest is based". No particular form is required for
the protest except that it be under oath. If no such
protest is filed the amount of the tax becomes final
upon the expiration of said sixty-day period.1 94
If a protest is filed within the sixty-day period the
commissioner must reconsider the computation and levy
of the tax complained of, and if the taxpayer has
requested in its protest, the commissioner must grant
an oral hearing. The commissioner's action becomes
final upon the expiration of thirty days from the date
when he mails notice of his action to the taxpayer
unless within that time an appeal is filed with the State
Board of Equalization. The appeal must be addressed
and mailed to that board and a copy of the appeal
mailed at the same time to the commissioner. The
Board of Equalization then hears and determines the
appeal and must forthwith notify the taxpayer and
commissioner of its determination, which becomes final
upon the expiration of sixty days from the time of such
determination unless within such sixty-day period the
commissioner shall bring an action in his name in a
court of competent jurisdiction to determine the liabil-
ity of the taxpayer." If such action be brought the
tax therein determined becomes final when the judg-
ment rendered in such action becomes final. This action
194. Supra note 192.
195. "The attorney general must prosecute such action and the pro-
visions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to service of
summons, pleadings, proofs, trials and appeals shall be appli-
cable thereto. In any such action the court shall have power to
render judgment for any tax, interest or penalties found by it
to be payable. In any judgment rendered under the provisions
of this section, interest shall be included at the rate of six per
centum per annum upon the amount of the deficiency computed
in the manner prescribed in subsection (a) of section 24 hereof."
Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 25, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c.
1066, sec. 4.
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apparently can only be brought by the commissioner
after determination by the State Board.90
The act mentions four times that the determination
may become "final": the first, upon the expiration of
sixty days after mailing by the commissioner of notice
of a proposed additional assessment if no protest is
filed within that time; the second, upon the expiration
of thirty days after the commissioner mails notice of
his action upon a protest if an appeal is not taken
within that time to the State Board of Equalization;
the third, upon the expiration of sixty days after the
determination by the board upon an appeal taken to it
if within that time a court action is not brought by the
commissioner; and fourth, when judgment rendered in
an action brought by the commissioner becomes final.
The statute provides that when a deficiency has been
determined and the tax has become final under the
terms of the statute the commissioner must mail notice
and demand to the taxpayer for the payment thereof,
and such tax is due and payable at the expiration of
ten days from the date of such notice and demand.'
Thus, if the determination becomes final at any one of
the four times above mentioned, notice of that fact
must be mailed to the taxpayer.'
585. Recovery of Illegally Collected Taxes.
It is very important to know the time when the
determination becomes final, for it has a very important
196. This action should not be confused with that which may be
brought by the controller for the recovery of delinquent taxes,
see supra p. 743.
197. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066, sec. 5.
198. "A certificate by the commissioner or of said board as the case
may be, of the mailing of the notices specified in this section shall
be prima facie evidence of the computation and levy of the de-
ficiency in tax and of the giving of said notices." Ibid.
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bearing upon the period within which an action may
be brought by the taxpayer for the recovery of-taxes
paid under protest. Section 30 of the act provides:
"Any taxpayer claiming that the tax computed
and levied against it is void in whole or in part
may pay its tax under protest and bring an action
against the state treasurer for the recovery of the
whole or any part of the amount paid. The pro-
test must be in writing and must state the grounds
upon which the claim is founded. Such action
must be filed within ninety days from the date of
mailing the notice of final determination of the
tax under section 25 hereof; provided, that no
action shall be filed unless the taxpayer has made
protest to the commissioner of the computation
and levy complained of under the provisions of
section 25 hereof."199
Interest at the rate of 6%7o per annum upon the amount
of the overpayment from the date of the payment or
collection thereof to a date not more than thirty days
preceding the date of the refund warrant shall be
included in the judgment if rendered in favor of the
taxpayer.200
It is not clear whether an appeal must be taken to
the State Board of Equalization before a court action
may be brought by the taxpayer or whether such action
may be brought after the determination by the com-
missioner.201 The statute provides that no action shall
199. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 30.
200. Ibid.
201. It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that
"a taxpayer who does not exhaust the remedy provided before
an administrative board to secure the correct assessment of a
tax cannot thereafter be heard by a judicial tribunal to assert
its invalidity." Farncomb v. Denver (1920) 252 U. S. 7, 10, 40
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be filed unless the taxpayer has made protest of the
computation and levy complained of to the commis-
sioner. This provision would seem to indicate that a
reconsideration by the commissioner is a condition
precedent to the bringing of an action but that an
appeal to the State Board of Equalization is not. The
act apparently allows the taxpayer to bring an action
within ninety days after mailing by the commissioner
of final determination by the court in the action brought
by the commissioner after determination by the Board
of Equalization. This remedy is quite unnecessary, as
the taxpayer's case would already have been decided
upon its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
and should be res judicata.
586. Refunds.
The act provides that,
"If in the opinion of the commissioner or said
board as the case may be, a tax has been computed
in a manner contrary to law or has been erro-
neously computed by reason of a clerical mistake
on the part of the commissioner or said board,
such fact shall be set forth in the records of the
commissioner, and the amount of the illegal levy
shall be refunded to the taxpayer or its successor
through reorganization, merger, or consolidation,
or to stockholders upon dissolution. If any tax
or penalty has been paid more than once, or has
been erroneously or illegally collected, the com-
Sup. Ct. 271; Milheim v. Tunnel District (1922) 262 U. S. 710,
723, 43 Sup. Ct. 694; First Nat. Bank v. Weld County (1924) 264
U. S. 450, 455, 44 Sup. Ct. 385; notes (1927) 27 Columbia L. Rev.
450, (1928) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 109; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. New York
(1924) 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80. See E. B. Stuson, Judicial
Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to Adminis-
tration Remedies (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 677.
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missioner shall certify to the state board of control
the amount collected in excess of what was legally
due, from whom it was collected, or by whom paid,
and if approved by that board, the same shall be
refunded to the taxpayer, but no such refund shall
be made in the case of overpayments made on or
before June 1, 1930, unless a claim therefor is
filed by the taxpayer with the commissioner on or
before June 1, 1931, and in the case of overpay-
ments made after June 1, 1930, unless such claim
is filed within one year from the date of overpay-
ment. Every claim for refund must be in writing
under oath and must state the specific grounds
upon which the claim is founded. Interest on
refunds shall be allowed and paid at the rate of
six per centum per annum from the date of the
overpayment to a date preceding the date of the
refund warrant by not more than thirty days,
such date to be determined by the commissioner.
In the event that a tax has been illegally levied
against a taxpayer the commissioner shall certify
such fact to the state board of control and said
board shall authorize the cancellation of the tax
upon the records of the commissioner."202
When a refund claim has been filed under the provi-
sions of the section just quoted, and the same has been
denied or no action thereon has been taken by the com-
missioner within six months from the filing thereof,
the taxpayer may bring an action against the state
treasurer on the grounds set forth in such claim for
the recovery of the whole or any part of the amount
claimed as an overpayment, but such action must be
202. Cal Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 27, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931,
c. 65, sec. 7.
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brought within ninety days from the date of the com-
missioner's final action upon such claim.203
The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, in
contrast with prior California tax laws, contains in
Sections 23, 27 and 30 provisions establishing a regular
method for the recovery of taxes illegally collected
under the act. A special fund called the bank and
corporation franchise tax fund is established204 and
this fund may be subjected to warrants of the controller
for the purpose of paying the refunds provided for
under the act.205 Such refunds with six per cent interest
will be allowed where the claim for a refund has been
approved by the proper administrative officer as set
forth in Section 27, or where there is a favorable
judgment in a suit for the recovery of taxes illegally
collected.206
In providing for refunds under a judgment the stat-
ute is not as clear as it should be upon the point that
the fund is to be subject to the judgment; for to author-
ize the court to enter a judgment for the amount of
wrongfully collected taxes and interest is not exactly
equivalent to the authorization of the controller to draw
his warrant upon the fund in favor of a corporation
obtaining a judgment. However, the sections in ques-
tion must be read together, and as so read they may
possibly be construed as expressing the legislative intent
that under the judgment provision taxpayers were to be
reimbursed by payment from the special fund through
warrants drawn by the controller.
An objection might be raised to the refund provi-
203. Cal. Stats, 1929, c. 13, sec. 30.
204. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 23.
205. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 27.
206. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, sec. 27, 30.
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sions upon the ground that they violate Article IV,
Section 22, of the State Constitution, which provides
that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury but
in consequence of appropriation made by law" in that
the refund provisions of the statute are not in terms
of appropriation. However, this objection does not
seem to be serious, in view of the holding that no set
form of words is necessary to constitute an appropria-
tion if the legislative intent is clearly expressed.207
Another objection to the refund provisions may be
raised under Article IV, Section 34, of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that "No bill making an appro-
priation of money, except the budget bill, shall contain
more than one item of appropriation, and that for one
single and certain purpose to be therein expressed".
Under this constitutional provision it has been held that
a statute is unconstitutional that provides for the issu-
ance of warrants by the controller for the payment of
judgments rendered against the state in tax cases. The
court declared that the statute there involved "does not
contain but one item of appropriation; it embraces as
many items as there may be persons having such claims
and obtaining finial judgment therefor".208 In that case,
however, the court was concerned with an appropria-
tion from the general fund. There is an intimation in
the case that if the money was to be drawn from a
special fund the rule would not be the same. The more
recent case of Ryan v. Riley20 9 gives support to this
view. That case upheld Section 30 of the Motor Vehicle
207. Ingram v. Colgan (1895) 106 Cal. 113, 38 Pac. 315, 39 Pac. 437,
46 Am. St. Rep. 221, 28 L. R. A. 187; Proll v. Dunn (1889) 80
Cal. 220, 22 Pac. 143; Stratton v. Green (1872) 45 Cal. 149.
208. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Chambers (1915) 169 Cal.
131, 145 Pac. 1025.
209. (1924) 65 Cal. App. 181, 223 Pac. 1027.
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Act appropriating money in the motor vehicle fund for
the expenses of maintaining the motor vehicle depart-
ment and the expenses incurred in carrying out the
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act and providing that
after deduction of such expenses the balance of the
fund was to be used as county and state highway main-
tenance funds. This statute was objected to on the
ground that it was not one item of appropriation nor
was it for a single purpose. While the reasoning of
the court is not convincing, the conclusion was reached
that inasmuch as the money was to be taken from a
special fund and not from the general fund there need
be no specific designation either as to purpose or
amount.




